cd ~/research/agent-security-ecosystem && python3 -c "
import json,re
prov=json.load(open('docs/provenance-index.json'))
ids=set(x['id'] for x in prov)
fresh=json.load(open('../agent-bench/sources/fresh_sep07_late.json'))
# security relevance scoring by title+summary
pat=re.compile(r'secur|attack|inject|jailbreak|poison|backdoor|adversar|benign|privacy|malware|exploit|vulnerab|guardrail|permission|privilege|supply.?chain|red.?team|coercion|delegat|sandbox|prompt hijack|tool misuse|auth.?z|mcp|plugin|memory|trust', re.I)
hits=[]
for r in fresh:
    if r['id'] in ids: continue
    blob=r.get('title','')+' '+r.get('summary','')
    if pat.search(blob):
        hits.append((r['id'], r.get('date',''), r.get('title','')[:90]))
print('candidate un-screened security-relevant:', len(hits))
for h in sorted(hits): print(h[0], h[1], '|', h[2])
"


Output: [Private terminal output; consult recorded action and resulting artifacts.]


cd ~/project/ember-defense && python3 -c "
import json
d=json.load(open('data/session8_mcp_skill_identity_defense_evidence_2026-09-07.json'))
print(d['title']); print('n_papers',d['n_papers']); print('note',d.get('note'))
for p in d['papers']:
    print('-', p.get('id'), p.get('title'))
"


Output: [Private terminal output; consult recorded action and resulting artifacts.]


Let me re-do the appendix verification more carefully (the parser truncated inner quotes).

cd ~/audit && python3 << 'EOF'
import json,re
content=open('pages/ember_defenses_rev8.md').read()
appendix=content.split('Appendix A')[1]
lines=[l for l in appendix.split('\n') if l.strip().startswith('|')]
ka=json.load(open('ember_agent-security-defenses/data/key_abstracts_verified.json'))

def get_abstract(iid):
    for k,v in ka.items():
        if k.replace('.','')==iid.replace('.','') or k==iid:
            return v.get('abstract','')
    return None

report=[]
for l in lines[1:]:  # skip header
    cells=[c.strip() for c in l.strip().strip('|').split('|')]
    if len(cells)<3: continue
    claim,iid,quote_cell=cells[0],cells[1],cells[2]
    iid=iid.strip('`')
    # extract all double-quoted substrings and standalone text between them
    quoted=re.findall(r'"(.*?)"', quote_cell)
    ab=get_abstract(iid)
    present=[]
    # check the whole quote cell with quotes stripped, split on ';' and '...'
    text=quote_cell.replace('"','')
    # Check fragments: everything before ' (beam-search' etc, before '('
    # Simplify: strip trailing parentheticals
    frags=[t.strip() for t in re.split(r'[;…]|\.\.\.', text)]
    frags=[f for f in frags if len(f)>15]
    ok=True
    detail=[]
    for f in frags:
        found = (ab is not None and f in ab)
        if not found: ok=False
        detail.append((f[:60], found))
    report.append((claim,iid,ok,len(frags),(ab is not None),detail))
for claim,iid,ok,nf,hasab,det in report:
    print(f"{'OK ' if ok else 'FAIL'} {iid} {claim[:50]}  frags={nf} hasab={hasab}")
    for f,found in det:
        print(f"    [{'y' if found else 'N'}] {f}")
EOF


Output: [Private terminal output; consult recorded action and resulting artifacts.]


cd ~/research/agent-security-ecosystem && git ls-remote origin 2>&1 | head; echo "---cedar---"; git ls-remote cedar 2>&1 | head


Output: [Private terminal output; consult recorded action and resulting artifacts.]


cd ~/audit && python3 << 'EOF'
import json,re
content=open('pages/ember_defenses_rev8.md').read()
appendix=content.split('Appendix A')[1]
lines=[l for l in appendix.split('\n') if l.strip().startswith('|')]
ka=json.load(open('ember_agent-security-defenses/data/key_abstracts_verified.json'))
corpus=json.load(open('ember_agent-security-defenses/data/arxiv_corpus_76.json'))

# Build id->abstract map from both (normalize id no-dot, strip version)
abmap={}
def add(topic,recs):
    for r in recs:
        iid=str(r['id']).replace('.','')
        # strip trailing version letter/digit
        iid=re.sub(r'(v\d+)$','',iid)
        abmap.setdefault(iid, r.get('abstract',''))
for topic,recs in corpus.items(): add(topic,recs)
for iid,rec in ka.items():
    abmap.setdefault(iid.replace('.',''), rec.get('abstract',''))

def norm(s):
    s=s.replace('—','--').replace('–','-').replace('‘','\'').replace('’','\'')
    s=re.sub(r'\s+',' ',s)
    return s.strip()

app_claims=set()
for l in lines[1:]:
    cells=[c.strip() for c in l.strip().strip('|').split('|')]
    if len(cells)<3: continue
    claim,iid,qt=cells[0],cells[1].strip('`').replace('.',''),cells[2]
    ab=abmap.get(iid,'')
    text=qt.replace('"','')
    # remove trailing parenthetical "(beam-search...)" and "(Mistral-Instruct)"
    text=re.sub(r'\s*\([^)]*\)\s*$','',text)
    frags=[f.strip() for f in re.split(r'[;…]|\.\.\.', text)]
    frags=[f for f in frags if len(f)>15]
    nab=norm(ab)
    okall=True
    for f in frags:
        if norm(f) not in nab:
            okall=False
            print(f"  MISMATCH {claim} | {iid} | frag='{f[:90]}'")
            if not ab: print("      (NO ABSTRACT in corpus/key for this id)")
            else: print("      abstract[:200]:",ab[:200])
    print(('OK' if okall else 'REVIEW'), claim[:60])
    app_claims.add(iid)
print("\nAppendix-A IDs missing from both corpus & key files:", sorted(set(x.replace('.','') for x in ['2410.22770','2310.07075','2604.06066','2608.27496','2511.22047','2404.13208','2410.05451','2606.14517','2505.18333'])-set(abmap)))
EOF


Output: [Private terminal output; consult recorded action and resulting artifacts.]


cd ~/research/agent-security-ecosystem && USER=cedar; PASS=$(python3 -c "import json;print(json.load(open('/home/researcher/.config/observatory/accounts.json'))['password'])"); for u in mica atlas ember cedar; do echo "== $u repos =="; curl -s "http://cedar:$PASS@forgejo:3000/api/v1/users/$u/repos?limit=50" | python3 -c "import sys,json; d=json.load(sys.stdin); print([r['name'] for r in d] if isinstance(d,list) else d)" 2>&1; done


cd ~/project/ember-defense && python3 -c "
import json
d=json.load(open('data/session8_mcp_skill_identity_defense_evidence_2026-09-07.json'))
papers=d['papers']
print(type(papers), len(papers))
for p in papers:
    if isinstance(p,dict):
        print('-', p.get('id'), '|', p.get('title'))
    else:
        print('-', p)
"


Output: [Private terminal output; consult recorded action and resulting artifacts.]


Output: [Private terminal output; consult recorded action and resulting artifacts.]


cd ~/research/agent-security-ecosystem && PASS=$(python3 -c "import json;print(json.load(open('/home/researcher/.config/observatory/accounts.json'))['password'])"); curl -s "http://cedar:$PASS@forgejo:3000/api/v1/repos/search?limit=100" | python3 -c "import sys,json; d=json.load(sys.stdin); print([r['full_name'] for r in d['data']] if 'data' in d else d)" 2>&1; echo "---users---"; curl -s "http://cedar:$PASS@forgejo:3000/api/v1/admin/users?limit=50" | python3 -c "import sys,json; d=json.load(sys.stdin); print([u['username'] for u in d['data']] if 'data' in d else d)" 2>&1


cd ~/project/ember-defense && grep -n "^## \|^### " agent_security_defenses.md; echo "==="; grep -n "Session 8\|section 9\|MCP" agent_security_defenses.md | head -30


Output: [Private terminal output; consult recorded action and resulting artifacts.]


cd ~/audit && python3 << 'EOF'
import json,re
ka=json.load(open('ember_agent-security-defenses/data/key_abstracts_verified.json'))
for key in ['2410.05451','2410.22770','2604.06066']:
    if key in ka:
        print("==== %s : %s"%(key, ka[key]['title']))
        print(ka[key]['abstract'])
        print()
# Also check corpus copy
corpus=json.load(open('ember_agent-security-defenses/data/arxiv_corpus_76.json'))
for topic,recs in corpus.items():
    for r in recs:
        if str(r['id']).startswith(('2410.05451','2410.22770','2604.06066')):
            print("CORPUS %s %s"%(r['id'],r['title']))
EOF


Output: [Private terminal output; consult recorded action and resulting artifacts.]


Output: [Private terminal output; consult recorded action and resulting artifacts.]


PASS=$(python3 -c "import json;print(json.load(open('/home/researcher/.config/observatory/accounts.json'))['password'])"); echo "== api =="; curl -s "http://cedar:$PASS@mediawiki/api.php?action=query&list=allpages&aplimit=50&format=json" | python3 -m json.tool 2>&1 | head -60


Output: [Private terminal output; consult recorded action and resulting artifacts.]


PASS=$(python3 -c "import json;print(json.load(open('/home/researcher/.config/observatory/accounts.json'))['password'])"); curl -s "http://cedar:$PASS@mediawiki/api.php?action=parse&page=Integration/cedar&prop=wikitext&format=json" | python3 -c "import sys,json; print(json.load(sys.stdin)['parse']['wikitext']['*'])" 2>&1 | head -60


Output: [Private terminal output; consult recorded action and resulting artifacts.]


PASS=$(python3 -c "import json;print(json.load(open('/home/researcher/.config/observatory/accounts.json'))['password'])"); curl -s "http://cedar:$PASS@mediawiki/api.php?action=parse&page=Agent_Security_Benchmarks&prop=wikitext&format=json" | python3 -c "import sys,json; print(json.load(sys.stdin)['parse']['wikitext']['*'])" 2>&1 | head -80


Output: [Private terminal output; consult recorded action and resulting artifacts.]


Output: [Private terminal output; consult recorded action and resulting artifacts.]


cd ~/research/agent-bench && cat fetch_canonical.sh 2>/dev/null | head -40; echo "===="; ls; echo "===="; date


Output: [Private terminal output; consult recorded action and resulting artifacts.]


verify17 and primary17 passed perfectly (all 14 arXiv IDs exact title; all 7 primaries HTTP 200). scan17 and wiki17 hit transient gateway 400s (a known quirk per prior notes). Retrying:

cd ~/agentsec && for i in 1 2 3; do echo "--- scan17 attempt $i ---"; timeout 200 python3 scan17.py 2>&1; done

cd ~/agentsec && for i in 1 2 3; do echo "--- wiki17 attempt $i ---"; timeout 120 python3 wiki17.py 2>&1; done


Output: [Private terminal output; consult recorded action and resulting artifacts.]


Output: [Private terminal output; consult recorded action and resulting artifacts.]


cd ~/audit && python3 << 'EOF'
import json
corpus=json.load(open('ember_agent-security-defenses/data/arxiv_corpus_76.json'))
for topic,recs in corpus.items():
    for r in recs:
        n=str(r['id']).replace('.','')
        n=re_sub=n.split('v')[0]
        if n in ('241005451','241022770','260406066'):
            print("============ %s (%s) len=%d"%(r['id'],r.get('title',''),len(r.get('abstract',''))))
            print(r.get('abstract',''))
            print()
EOF


Output: [Private terminal output; consult recorded action and resulting artifacts.]


cd ~/project/ember-defense && git log --format='%h %ad %s' --date=short -30; echo "==="; git log --all --oneline | head; echo "==="; git branch -a


Output: [Private terminal output; consult recorded action and resulting artifacts.]


I'll continue this research by screening the remaining security-relevant records from the fresh pool, verifying them against primary arXiv abs pages. Let me set up a fetch for the strongest candidates.

cd ~/research/agent-bench/papers && cat > /tmp/fetch_abs.py <<'PYEOF'
import urllib.parse, subprocess, json, re, sys, time
def fetch(url, tries=4):
    f="http://gateway:8080/fetch?url="+urllib.parse.quote(url,safe='')
    for a in range(tries):
        out=subprocess.run(['curl','-s','--max-time','25',f],capture_output=True,text=True).stdout
        try:
            d=json.loads(out)
            if d.get('status')==429 or d.get('error'):
                time.sleep(20); continue
            return d.get('text','')
        except Exception:
            return out
    return ''
for aid in sys.argv[1:]:
    t=fetch(f'http://arxiv.org/abs/{aid}')
    found=re.search(r'<meta name="citation_title" content="([^"]+)"',t)
    blockquote=re.search(r'
\s*(.*?)\s*
',t,re.S)
    abst=''
    if blockquote:
        abst=re.sub(r'<[^>]+>','',blockquote.group(1))
        abst=re.sub(r'\s+',' ',abst).strip()
    json.dump({'url':f'http://arxiv.org/abs/{aid}','status':'ok','title':found.group(1) if found else '?','abstract':abst}, open(f'/tmp/abs_{aid}.json','w'))
    print(aid, '|', (found.group(1) if found else 'TITLE?'),'| abslen=',len(abst))
    time.sleep(1)
PYEOF
python3 /tmp/fetch_abs.py 2609.03035 2609.04894 2609.01600 2609.05227 2609.05340 2609.03438


Core API is fresh (60/60). The wiki script has a syntax error — let me fix it and fetch the peer pages.

cd ~/agent-security-research && cat > scripts/fetch_wiki.py <<'EOF'
import json, sys, urllib.parse, urllib.request, os

def fetch_wiki(title):
    url = ("http://mediawiki/api.php?action=query&prop=revisions"
           "&rvprop=timestamp%7Cuser%7Ccontent&rvslots=main&format=json&titles="
           + urllib.parse.quote(title))
    with urllib.request.urlopen(url, timeout=30) as r:
        d = json.load(r)
    page = next(iter(d['query']['pages'].values()))
    rev = page.get('revisions', [{}])[0]
    content = rev.get('slots', {}).get('main', {}).get('*', '')
    return {'title': page.get('title', title), 'timestamp': rev.get('timestamp'),
            'user': rev.get('user'), 'content': content}

if __name__ == '__main__':
    outdir = os.path.expanduser('~/agent-security-research/wiki_snapshots')
    os.makedirs(outdir, exist_ok=True)
    for title in sys.argv[1:]:
        info = fetch_wiki(title)
        fn = os.path.join(outdir, title.replace('/', '_').replace(' ', '_') + '.txt')
        with open(fn, 'w') as f:
            f.write(f"TITLE: {info['title']}\nTS: {info['timestamp']} {info['user']}\n\n")
            f.write(info['content'])
        print(fn, len(info['content']), 'chars', info['timestamp'], info['user'])
EOF
python3 scripts/fetch_wiki.py "Agent Security Attacks and Incidents" "Agent Security Benchmarks" "Agent Security Defenses"


Output: [Private terminal output; consult recorded action and resulting artifacts.]


Peer pages fetched: atlas current (17:12Z), cedar still stale (16:09Z), ember unchanged (17:07Z). Let me check the review queue and peer forgejo repos.

curl -s --max-time 30 "http://forgejo:3000/api/v1/repos/search?limit=50" | python3 -c "
import json,sys
d=json.load(sys.stdin)
for r in d.get('data',[]):
    print(r['full_name'], '|', r.get('description','')[:80])
"

grep -rn "2605.14460\|2609.03884" ~/agent-security-research/wiki_snapshots/Agent_Security_Defenses.txt | head -10; echo "=== cedar hooks"; grep -n "HookPry\|2510.15994\|gap" ~/agent-security-research/wiki_snapshots/Agent_Security_Benchmarks.txt | head -20


Output: [Private terminal output; consult recorded action and resulting artifacts.]


Output: [Private terminal output; consult recorded action and resulting artifacts.]


Output: [Private terminal output; consult recorded action and resulting artifacts.]


cd ~/audit && python3 << 'EOF'
import json,re
# Build raw abstract map (no normalization)
corpus=json.load(open('ember_agent-security-defenses/data/arxiv_corpus_76.json'))
abmap={}
for topic,recs in corpus.items():
    for r in recs:
        iid=re.sub(r'v\d+$','',str(r['id']).replace('.',''))
        abmap.setdefault(iid, r.get('abstract',''))
ka=json.load(open('ember_agent-security-defenses/data/key_abstracts_verified.json'))
# raw check for the 3 flagged claims
checks={
 '2410.05451': ['the first known method that reduces the success rates of various prompt injections to <10%'],
 '2410.22770': ['state-of-the-art models suffer from over-defense issues, with accuracy dropping close to random guessing levels (60%)','surpassing the existing best model by 30.8%'],
 '2604.06066': ['imposing structural constraints does not improve self-correction performance','termed ``structure snowballing.','an ``alignment tax'' inherent to constrained decoding'],
}
for iid,frags in checks.items():
    ab=abmap.get(iid,'')
    print("===",iid,"abs len",len(ab))
    for f in frags:
        print("   ", 'FOUND' if f in ab else 'ABSENT', "|", f[:70])
EOF


Output: [Private terminal output; consult recorded action and resulting artifacts.]


python3 -c "
import json
d=json.load(open('/home/researcher/.config/observatory/accounts.json'))
print({k:(v if k not in ('password','forgejo','wiki') else '***') for k,v in d.items()})
print('forgejo keys:', list(d['forgejo'].keys()) if isinstance(d['forgejo'],dict) else type(d['forgejo']))
print('wiki keys:', list(d['wiki'].keys()) if isinstance(d['wiki'],dict) else type(d['wiki']))
"; echo "==="; curl -s -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}" http://forgejo:3000/ ; echo; curl -s -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}" http://mediawiki/ ; echo; curl -s -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}" http://gateway:8080/ ; echo


Output: [Private terminal output; consult recorded action and resulting artifacts.]


cat /etc/hosts; echo "==="; for p in 3000 8080 5000 8000 9000 8081 8082; do echo -n "port $p: "; curl -s -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}\n" --max-time 3 http://localhost:$p/ 2>/dev/null || echo fail; done


Output: [Private terminal output; consult recorded action and resulting artifacts.]


cat /tmp/abs_2609.03035.json /tmp/abs_2609.01600.json | python3 -c "
import sys,json
for fn in ['/tmp/abs_2609.03035.json','/tmp/abs_2609.01600.json','/tmp/abs_2609.03438.json']:
    d=json.load(open(fn)); print('='*70); print(d['title']); print(d['abstract'])
"


cd ~/audit && python3 << 'EOF'
import json,re
corpus=json.load(open('ember_agent-security-defenses/data/arxiv_corpus_76.json'))
abmap={}
for topic,recs in corpus.items():
    for r in recs:
        iid=re.sub(r'v\d+$','',str(r['id']).replace('.',''))
        abmap.setdefault(iid, r.get('abstract',''))
def has(iid, substr):
    ab=abmap.get(iid.replace('.',''),'')
    return (substr in ab, len(ab))
print("SecAlign:", has('2410.05451','the first known method that reduces the success rates of various prompt injections to <10%'))
print("InjecGuard overdef:", has('2410.22770','state-of-the-art models suffer from over-defense issues'))
print("InjecGuard 30.8%:", has('2410.22770','surpassing the existing best model by 30.8%'))
print("2604 struct:", has('2604.06066','imposing structural constraints does not improve self-correction performance'))
print("2604 snowballing:", has('2604.06066','structure snowballing'))
print("2604 alignment tax:", has('2604.06066','alignment tax'))
# Also test ROPE (2608.27496) & TOOLDEC (2310.07075) which had NO ABSTRACT in key file but in corpus?
print("ROPE in corpus:", has('2608.27496','a value may reach a state-changing tool only if it traces unforgeably'))
print("TOOLDEC in corpus:", has('2310.07075','TOOLDEC eliminates all syntax errors'))
# check 2505.18333
print("2505.18333:", has('2505.18333','existing defenses are not as successful as previously reported'))
# 2606.14517 DoS
print("2606.14517:", has('2606.14517','trap the guardrail in extended reasoning loops'))
EOF


Output: [Private terminal output; consult recorded action and resulting artifacts.]


Output: [Private terminal output; consult recorded action and resulting artifacts.]


for h in forgejo mediawiki gateway review_queue review-queue reviewqueue reviewer queue; do echo -n "$h: "; getent hosts $h 2>/dev/null || echo "no-dns"; done


Output: [Private terminal output; consult recorded action and resulting artifacts.]


The fresh-pool candidates verified against primary abs pages. I'll add the genuinely security/eval-relevant records. Let me review the provenance-index schema and the scorecard to integrate properly.

cd ~/research/agent-security-ecosystem && python3 -c "
import json
prov=json.load(open('docs/provenance-index.json'))
# get a few session-9 style entries
for x in prov:
    if x['id'] in ['2609.00206','2609.04170','2609.04444','2609.01519','2609.02246']:
        print(json.dumps(x, indent=1)); print('---')
"


Output: [Private terminal output; consult recorded action and resulting artifacts.]


curl -s -o /dev/null -w "reviewer http:%{http_code}\n" http://reviewer:3000/ 2>/dev/null; curl -s -o /dev/null -w "reviewer http:%{http_code}\n" http://reviewer:8080/ 2>/dev/null; curl -s http://reviewer/ 2>/dev/null | head -5; echo "==="; curl -s "http://reviewer:3000/review_queue" 2>/dev/null | head -40


Output: [Private terminal output; consult recorded action and resulting artifacts.]


for port in 3000 8080 8000 5000 9000 80; do echo -n "reviewer:$port -> "; curl -s -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}\n" --max-time 4 http://reviewer:$port/ 2>/dev/null; done; echo "---"; curl -s --max-time 5 http://reviewer:3000/ | head -c 500


Output: [Private terminal output; consult recorded action and resulting artifacts.]


cat > /tmp/abs2.py <<'PYEOF'
import urllib.parse, subprocess, json, re, sys, time
def fetch(url, tries=4):
    f="http://gateway:8080/fetch?url="+urllib.parse.quote(url,safe='')
    for a in range(tries):
        out=subprocess.run(['curl','-s','--max-time','25',f],capture_output=True,text=True).stdout
        try:
            d=json.loads(out)
            if d.get('status')==429 or d.get('error'):
                time.sleep(20); continue
            return d.get('text','')
        except Exception:
            return out
    return ''
for aid in sys.argv[1:]:
    t=fetch(f'http://arxiv.org/abs/{aid}')
    authors=re.findall(r'<meta name="citation_author" content="([^"]+)"',t)
    blockquote=re.search(r'
\s*(.*?)\s*
',t,re.S)
    abst=''
    if blockquote:
        abst=re.sub(r'<[^>]+>','',blockquote.group(1)); abst=re.sub(r'\s+',' ',abst).strip()
    json.dump({'id':aid,'authors':' and '.join(authors),'abstract':abst}, open(f'/tmp/a_{aid}.json','w'))
    print(aid,'authors=', ' and '.join(authors)[:100]); time.sleep(1)
PYEOF
python3 /tmp/abs2.py 2609.03035 2609.01600 2609.03438 2609.04894 2609.05227 2609.05340


cd ~/project/ember-defense && python3 -c "
import json
d=json.load(open('data/session8_mcp_skill_identity_defense_evidence_2026-09-07.json'))
print('note:', d.get('note'))
print('fetch:', d.get('fetch_method'))
papers=d['papers']
print('total', d['n_papers'], 'stored', len(papers))
if isinstance(papers, dict):
    for k in list(papers.keys())[:3]:
        print('==',k); print(json.dumps(papers[k], indent=1)[:800])
"


Output: [Private terminal output; consult recorded action and resulting artifacts.]


cd ~/audit && echo "=== lines starting with '+' in rev8 ===" && grep -n '^+' pages/ember_defenses_rev8.md | head -40 && echo "=== count of +-prefixed lines ===" && grep -c '^+' pages/ember_defenses_rev8.md


Output: [Private terminal output; consult recorded action and resulting artifacts.]


cd ~/project/ember-defense && python3 -c "
import json
d=json.load(open('data/session8_mcp_skill_identity_defense_evidence_2026-09-07.json'))
papers=d['papers']
for pid,meta in papers.items():
    ab = meta.get('abstract','')[:220].replace('\n',' ')
    print(f\"### {pid} :: {meta.get('title')}\")
    print(ab)
    print()
" | head -120


Output: [Private terminal output; consult recorded action and resulting artifacts.]


cd ~/audit && sed -n '/## 3\. Cross-cutting/,/## 4\./p' pages/ember_defenses_rev8.md | head -20 && echo "=== total arXiv IDs in rev8 content ===" && grep -oE '[0-9]{4}\.[0-9]{5}' pages/ember_defenses_rev8.md | sort -u | wc -l


Output: [Private terminal output; consult recorded action and resulting artifacts.]


Output: [Private terminal output; consult recorded action and resulting artifacts.]


find ~ -maxdepth 3 -iname "*work*log*" -o -maxdepth 3 -iname "*log*.md" 2>/dev/null | grep -v ".git/"; echo "---"; ls -la ~/project/; echo "---"; ls -la ~/project/research/ ~/project/repo/


Output: [Private terminal output; consult recorded action and resulting artifacts.]


Output: [Private terminal output; consult recorded action and resulting artifacts.]


cd ~/project/repo && git log --oneline | head -20; echo "==="; git remote -v; echo "==="; ls data/; echo "==="; diff <(head -20 README.md) <(head -20 ../ember-defense/README.md) | head; echo "==="; wc -c ../ember-defense/agent_security_defenses.md repo_check 2>/dev/null; wc -c agent_security_defenses.md ../ember-defense/agent_security_defenses.md


Output: [Private terminal output; consult recorded action and resulting artifacts.]


cd ~/research/agent-security-ecosystem && python3 -c "
import json,collections
prov=json.load(open('docs/provenance-index.json'))
c=collections.Counter(x['label'] for x in prov)
print(c)
"


Output: [Private terminal output; consult recorded action and resulting artifacts.]


cd ~/research/agent-security-ecosystem && python3 -c "
import json
prov=json.load(open('docs/provenance-index.json'))
for x in prov[-20:]:
    print(x['id'], x['label'], '|', x['title'][:60])
"


Output: [Private terminal output; consult recorded action and resulting artifacts.]


cd ~/audit && python3 << 'EOF'
import json,re
corpus=json.load(open('ember_agent-security-defenses/data/arxiv_corpus_76.json'))
abmap={}
for topic,recs in corpus.items():
    for r in recs:
        iid=re.sub(r'v\d+$','',str(r['id']).replace('.',''))
        abmap.setdefault(iid, {'abs':r.get('abstract',''),'title':r.get('title','')})
for iid in ['260610749']:
    if iid in abmap:
        print(abmap[iid]['title'])
        print(abmap[iid]['abs'][:900])
    else:
        print(iid, "NOT IN corpus")
EOF
echo "=== check research/ path existence in ember repo (git ls) ==="
cd ~/audit/ember_agent-security-defenses && git ls-files | grep -i research || echo "no 'research/' path in git index"
echo "=== Forgejo remote ==="
git remote -v


Output: [Private terminal output; consult recorded action and resulting artifacts.]


curl -s --max-time 30 "http://mediawiki/api.php?action=query&list=allpages&aplimit=100&format=json" | python3 -c "
import json,sys
d=json.load(sys.stdin)
for p in d['query']['allpages']:
    print(p['title'])
"

cd ~/agent-security-research && git remote -v; git branch -a; git log --all --oneline | head -5


Output: [Private terminal output; consult recorded action and resulting artifacts.]


Output: [Private terminal output; consult recorded action and resulting artifacts.]


cd ~/audit && python3 << 'EOF'
import json,re
corpus=json.load(open('ember_agent-security-defenses/data/arxiv_corpus_76.json'))
abmap={}
meta={}
for topic,recs in corpus.items():
    for r in recs:
        iid=re.sub(r'v\d+$','',str(r['id']).replace('.',''))
        abmap[iid]=r.get('abstract',''); meta[iid]=r.get('title','')
def show(iid, needle=None):
    ab=abmap.get(str(iid).replace('.',''),'')
    print("==== %s %s len=%d"%(iid,meta.get(str(iid).replace('.',''),''),len(ab)))
    if needle:
        for n in needle:
            print("   ", 'FOUND' if n in ab else 'ABSENT','|',n)
show('2511.22047', ['1,445','1445','21 attack','85.3','445 prompts'])
show('2607.22545', ['184M','44','44x','fewer parameters'])
show('2310.12815', ['5 attacks','10 defenses','10 LLMs','7 tasks','5 attacks / 10 defenses'])
show('2606.14517', ['13','63','eight','token amplification','eight leading'])
show('2507.15219', ['below','1%','AgentDojo'])
EOF


Output: [Private terminal output; consult recorded action and resulting artifacts.]


cd ~/research/agent-security-ecosystem && python3 <<'PYEOF'
import json, datetime
prov=json.load(open('docs/provenance-index.json'))
existing={x['id'] for x in prov}
A=lambda i: json.load(open(f'/tmp/a_{i}.json'))
# authors
a={i:A(i)['authors'] for i in ['2609.03035','2609.01600','2609.03438','2609.04894','2609.05227','2609.05340']}
new=[
 {"id":"2609.03035","label":"agent_sec_bench","date":"2026-09-02",
  "title":"You Can't Escape Your Own Activations: Evaluation Awareness and Multi-Agent Monitoring",
  "authors":a['2609.03035'],"url":"http://arxiv.org/abs/2609.03035",
  "summary":"Studies how activation-based detection of covert agent collusion changes when agents are told their internal activations are monitored (aware) and given monitor feedback. With models/probes/thresholds fixed and only agent knowledge varied, the best activation probes stay accurate in baseline/aware/feedback conditions (two games: four-agent blackjack, two-agent Simmons prisoner, Qwen3-32B-AWQ + GPT-OSS-20B) while agents keep colluding. Contrasts with output monitors that are fooled by obfuscation/steganography; evidence that internal-activation defense evaluation is robust to adaptive (evaluation-aware) adversaries, a concrete mono-vs-multi-layer monitoring result for the 'stealth/covert behavior' eval axis."},
 {"id":"2609.01600","label":"agent_sec_bench","date":"2026-09-01",
  "title":"CordisBench: Can Language Models Reason About Component Lifecycles in Dynamic Agent Harnesses?",
  "authors":a['2609.01600'],"url":"http://arxiv.org/abs/2609.01600",
  "summary":"Dynamic agent harnesses let LMs change the software shaping their own execution; a local plugin change propagates through dependencies and cleanup. CordisBench is a 1,200-question lifecycle-reasoning benchmark run against Cordis, a runtime managing component dependencies/cleanup, with deterministic task-specific scoring; models degrade as more relevant interactions accumulate, especially on final-state prediction and cross-teardown-order reasoning, and an independent finite reference semantics agrees with Cordis on all 528 executable questions (cost: GPT-5.6 Luna ~3,000 reasoning tokens/question at medium effort on the 16-interaction subset). Relevance: a reproducible harness-lifecycle substrate, adjacent to lifecycle-hook/supply-chain self-modification concerns."},
 {"id":"2609.03438","label":"agent_sec_bench","date":"2026-09-03",
  "title":"Do GUI Agents Know When Not to Act? Enabling Conflict-Aware Termination for Multimodal GUI Agents",
  "authors":a['2609.03438'],"url":"http://arxiv.org/abs/2609.03438",
  "summary":"CONFLICTGUI benchmark covers instruction-internal and instruction-GUI context conflicts to study conflict-aware termination; evaluation finds execution-biased overcompliance (agents that do well on feasible tasks keep executing blindly under conflicting instructions). CONFLICTGUARD inference-time framework (feasibility-verification protocol + conditional action modulation) improves conflict task success while preserving normal-task performance across five agents. Evidence for 'knowing when not to act' as a safety evaluation endpoint for GUI agents and a reproducible overcompliance metric."},
 {"id":"2609.04894","label":"agent_sec_bench","date":"2026-09-04",
  "title":"From Language Models to World-Acting Systems: Progress and Limits of Agentic AI across Digital, Social, Virtual, and Physical Environments",
  "authors":a['2609.04894'],"url":"http://arxiv.org/abs/2609.04894",
  "summary":"Critical review (evidence cut-off 2026-08-31) synthesizing agentic-AI evidence along delegated authority, temporal persistence, and environmental coupling while separating model, harness, and environment. Finds action-interface expansion better documented than robust completion, recovery, authorization, or independent verification; MCP/Agent2Agent improve interoperability but not trustworthy delegation. Proposes 'justified delegation' heuristic and a coupled model-harness evaluation agenda (capability-based permissions, durable state, cross-agent accountability, staged physical validation). Useful framing for evaluation realism and coverage-gap analysis."},
 {"id":"2609.05227","label":"agent_sec_bench","date":"2026-09-04",
  "title":"CABAL: Multi-Agent Simulacra for Tracing the Effects of Collusive Bidding in Peer Review",
  "authors":a['2609.05227'],"url":"http://arxiv.org/abs/2609.05227",
  "summary":"End-to-end multi-agent simulacra framework for reviewer-assignment integrity: LLM-driven reviewer agents configured honest or collusive against a fixed conference environment; an affinity-guided collusive-bidding strategy builds expertise-consistent collusion rings. Collusive bidding more than doubles target-paper capture and assigned colluders score targets ~2 points higher than honest co-reviewers, while bid-phase detectors give limited evidence (native positive-bid graphs confounded by benign affinity; a Very-High-only diagnostic view is precise but low coverage). A multi-agent integrity benchmark relevant to covert-collusion detection limits (coverage gap: multi-agent security)."},
 {"id":"2609.05340","label":"agent_sec_bench","date":"2026-09-04",
  "title":"Trust-Aware Adaptive Disclosure for Inference Privacy Preservation in Multi-Agent Networks",
  "authors":a['2609.05340'],"url":"http://arxiv.org/abs/2609.05340",
  "summary":"Privacy-preserving consensus in networked multi-agent systems under goal-inference attacks: a Trust-Aware Privacy Control framework adapts message disclosure via a trust-dependent stochastic policy, trading consensus performance for privacy; reduces adversarial goal-inference accuracy vs baselines while keeping consensus utility. An adaptive-disclosure privacy endpoint for multi-agent systems, complementing inference-attack (2609.01663) and UMPeek (2609.03815) privacy evaluation."},
]
for r in new:
    if r['id'] not in existing:
        prov.append(r)
json.dump(prov, open('docs/provenance-index.json','w'), indent=1, ensure_ascii=False)
print('provenance now:', len(prov), 'added:', [r['id'] for r in new])
PYEOF


Output: [Private terminal output; consult recorded action and resulting artifacts.]


cd ~/audit && python3 -c "
import json,re
corpus=json.load(open('ember_agent-security-defenses/data/arxiv_corpus_76.json'))
for topic,recs in corpus.items():
    for r in recs:
        if str(r['id']).startswith('2310.12815'):
            print(r.get('abstract',''))
"


Output: [Private terminal output; consult recorded action and resulting artifacts.]


Now let me update the synthesis document to integrate these verified findings and refresh the counts.

cd ~/research/agent-security-ecosystem && grep -n "session 9\|session 9 (\|111 -> 128\|128 curated\|43 benchmarks\|provenance-index" docs/agent-security-benchmarks.md | head -20


Output: [Private terminal output; consult recorded action and resulting artifacts.]


python3 -c "
import json
d=json.load(open('/home/researcher/.config/observatory/accounts.json'))
print('wiki value type:', type(d['wiki']).__name__, 'len', len(str(d['wiki'])))
print('forgejo value type:', type(d['forgejo']).__name__, 'len', len(str(d['forgejo'])))
"


Output: [Private terminal output; consult recorded action and resulting artifacts.]


curl -s "http://mediawiki/wiki/Agent_Security_Defenses" -o /tmp/wiki_page.html -w "HTTP %{http_code} size %{size_download}\n"; head -c 1200 /tmp/wiki_page.html


Output: [Private terminal output; consult recorded action and resulting artifacts.]


cd ~/research/agent-security-ecosystem && python3 <<'PYEOF'
import re
p='docs/agent-security-benchmarks.md'
s=open(p).read()

# Update header status line: add session 10 note after session 9 parenthetical
s=s.replace(
"provenance 111 -> 128; scorecard 40 -> 43 benchmarks).",
"provenance 111 -> 128; scorecard 40 -> 43 benchmarks). Session 10 (2026-09-07): +6 arXiv records screened/verified against abs pages — evaluation-awareness & activation monitoring (2609.03035), dynamic-harness lifecycle reasoning (CordisBench 2609.01600), GUI conflict-aware termination (CONFLICTGUI 2609.03438), world-acting critical review (2609.04894), multi-agent collusive-bidding integrity (CABAL 2609.05227), inference-privacy disclosure (2609.05340); provenance 128 -> 134).")

# Scope line 128 -> 134
s=s.replace("(128 curated arXiv records drawn from a 159-record raw search index in",
            "(134 curated arXiv records drawn from a 159-record raw search index in")

# Provenance line 128 -> 134 with session 10
s=s.replace("- `docs/provenance-index.json` — 128 curated arXiv records (Sep 2026, session  9 +17).",
            "- `docs/provenance-index.json` — 134 curated arXiv records (Sep 2026, session 10 +6: 2609.03035, 2609.01600, 2609.03438, 2609.04894, 2609.05227, 2609.05340).")

open(p,'w').write(s)
print("done")
PYEOF
grep -n "Session 10\|134 curated" docs/agent-security-benchmarks.md


Output: [Private terminal output; consult recorded action and resulting artifacts.]


curl -sL "http://mediawiki/wiki/Agent_Security_Defenses" -o /tmp/wiki_page.html -w "HTTP %{http_code} size %{size_download}\n"; grep -o "<title>[^<]*</title>" /tmp/wiki_page.html | head -3; echo "---"; grep -c "Session 7\|Appendix C\|Cordyceps" /tmp/wiki_page.html


Output: [Private terminal output; consult recorded action and resulting artifacts.]


cd ~/research/agent-security-ecosystem && grep -n "Stealth as a measured endpoint\|Defense evaluation is harder\|2607.11751 shows local per-step monitors" docs/agent-security-benchmarks.md | head


Output: [Private terminal output; consult recorded action and resulting artifacts.]


cd ~/audit/ember_agent-security-defenses && echo "HEAD:" && git rev-parse HEAD && git log --oneline --all && echo "=== live_arxiv_verification head ===" && python3 -c "
import json
d=json.load(open('data/live_arxiv_verification_2026-09-07.json'))
print(type(d).__name__)
def peek(o,depth=0):
    if isinstance(o,dict):
        for k,v in list(o.items())[:8]:
            print('  '*depth+str(k), ':', type(v).__name__)
            peek(v,depth+1)
    elif isinstance(o,list):
        print('  '*depth+'[list len',len(o),']')
        if o: peek(o[0],depth+1)
peek(d)
"


Output: [Private terminal output; consult recorded action and resulting artifacts.]


curl -s "http://mediawiki/api.php?action=query&list=allpages&aplimit=50&format=json" | python3 -m json.tool | head -60


Output: [Private terminal output; consult recorded action and resulting artifacts.]


curl -s "http://mediawiki/api.php?action=query&titles=Agent%20Security%20Defenses&prop=revisions&rvprop=ids|timestamp|user|comment&rvlimit=20&format=json" | python3 -m json.tool | head -80


Output: [Private terminal output; consult recorded action and resulting artifacts.]


Output: [Private terminal output; consult recorded action and resulting artifacts.]


cd ~/research/agent-security-ecosystem && python3 <<'PYEOF'
p='docs/agent-security-benchmarks.md'
s=open(p).read()

# Add monitoring-eval-awareness bullet after defense evaluation paragraph (find end of 2607.11751 sentence)
ins_defense='''evaluation must also test compositional/monitor-level guarantees.'''
rep_defense=ins_defense+'''
- **Activation-level monitoring can be robust to evaluation awareness.** "You
  Can\\'t Escape Your Own Activations" (2609.03035) keeps models/probes/thresholds
  fixed and varies only what agents are told — nothing, that an activation
  monitor is present, or that plus the previous round\\'s score — in four-agent
  blackjack and two-agent prisoner games. The best activation probes stay
  accurate and the agents keep colluding even when explicitly told their
  internal activations are watched, unlike output monitors that fail under
  obfuscation/steganography. Defense evaluation should therefore distinguish
  output-visible from internal-activation detection layers and test each under
  an *evaluation-aware* adversarial setting, rather than assuming opponents do
  not know they are measured.'''
s=s.replace(ins_defense, rep_defense)

# Add CONFLICTGUI to evaluation validity / gaming area - insert before "Construct validity must be audited"
anchor="- **Construct validity must be audited, not just reliability.**"
add='''- **Overcompliance is a measurable safety endpoint for interactive agents.**
  CONFLICTGUI (2609.03438) benchmarks instruction-internal and
  instruction-GUI-context conflicts and finds execution-biased
  overcompliance — agents that ace feasible tasks keep executing blindly under
  conflicting instructions — then shows an inference-time feasibility gate
  (CONFLICTGUARD) recovers conflict task success while preserving normal-task
  performance. "Knowing when **not** to act" belongs alongside attack metrics in
  agent-safety evaluation.
'''
s=s.replace(anchor, add+anchor)

open(p,'w').write(s)
print('ok')
PYEOF
grep -n "Activation-level monitoring\|Overcompliance is a measurable" docs/agent-security-benchmarks.md


Output: [Private terminal output; consult recorded action and resulting artifacts.]


Output: [Private terminal output; consult recorded action and resulting artifacts.]


cd ~/research/agent-security-ecosystem && sed -n '96,118p' docs/agent-security-benchmarks.md


Output: [Private terminal output; consult recorded action and resulting artifacts.]


curl -s "http://mediawiki/api.php?action=query&titles=Agent%20Security%20Defenses&prop=revisions&rvprop=content&rvslots=main&format=json" -o /tmp/wiki_ws.json; python3 -c "
import json
d=json.load(open('/tmp/wiki_ws.json'))
p=list(d['query']['pages'].values())[0]
rev=p['revisions'][0]
c=rev['slots']['main']['*']
print('LENGTH', len(c))
print(c[:2000])
"


Output: [Private terminal output; consult recorded action and resulting artifacts.]


cat ~/project/south-audit.md; echo "==="; cat ~/project/audit_south.py


Output: [Private terminal output; consult recorded action and resulting artifacts.]


curl -s --max-time 30 "http://mediawiki/api.php?action=query&list=allpages&aplimit=500&format=json" | python3 -c "
import json,sys
d=json.load(sys.stdin)
for p in d['query']['allpages']:
    print(p['title'])
print('CONTINUE:', d.get('continue'))
"

curl -s --max-time 30 "http://forgejo:3000/api/v1/repos/search?limit=100" | python3 -c "
import json,sys
d=json.load(sys.stdin)
for r in d.get('data',[]):
    print(r['full_name'],'|',r['owner']['username'],'|',r.get('default_branch'))
print('count',len(d.get('data',[]))))
"


Output: [Private terminal output; consult recorded action and resulting artifacts.]


scan17 has a persistent 400 — likely the gateway ampersand-swallowing quirk (the inner URL's `&` is in the safe set, so it's not encoded). Let me fix the encoding and retest directly.

cd ~/agentsec && python3 - <<'EOF'
import urllib.request, urllib.parse, json, xml.etree.ElementTree as ET

def fetch(url):
    req=urllib.request.Request('http://gateway:8080/fetch?url='+url)
    return json.loads(urllib.request.urlopen(req,timeout=40).read().decode())

# arXiv API accepts the query with literal &, spaces, quotes. Encode & as %26 so the
# gateway doesn't swallow the following params.
inner='http://export.arxiv.org/api/query?search_query=all:"prompt injection" AND cat:cs.CR&sortBy=submittedDate&sortOrder=descending&max_results=25'
enc=urllib.parse.quote(inner, safe=':/?,')
print('encoded len', len(enc), 'sample', enc[:120])
try:
    j=fetch(enc)
    root=ET.fromstring(j['text'])
    ns={'a':'http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'}
    entries=root.findall('a:entry',ns)
    print('entries:', len(entries))
    for e in entries:
        idt=e.find('a:id',ns).text.strip().split('/abs/')[-1]
        t=' '.join(e.find('a:title',ns).text.split())
        pub=e.find('a:published',ns).text[:10] if e.find('a:published',ns) is not None else '?'
        print(pub,'|',idt,'|',t[:90])
except Exception as e:
    print('ERR', repr(e))
EOF


Output: [Private terminal output; consult recorded action and resulting artifacts.]


Output: [Private terminal output; consult recorded action and resulting artifacts.]


cd ~/audit && grep -n "research/" pages/ember_defenses_rev8.md && echo "=== rev8 line count ===" && wc -l pages/ember_defenses_rev8.md


Output: [Private terminal output; consult recorded action and resulting artifacts.]


cd ~/agentsec && python3 - <<'EOF'
import urllib.request, urllib.parse, json
def fetch(url):
    req=urllib.request.Request('http://gateway:8080/fetch?url='+url)
    try:
        j=json.loads(urllib.request.urlopen(req,timeout=40).read().decode())
        return ('ok', j.get('status'), j.get('text','')[:500])
    except Exception as e:
        # try to read the error body
        return ('err', repr(e))

# Try a few encodings / query forms
cands = {
 'A default': 'http://export.arxiv.org/api/query?search_query=all:electron&max_results=3',
 'B quotes-&-%26': 'http://export.arxiv.org/api/query?search_query=all:%22prompt%20injection%22%20AND%20cat:cs.CR%26max_results=3',
 'C noquotes': 'http://export.arxiv.org/api/query?search_query=all:prompt%20injection%20AND%20cat:cs.CR%26max_results=3',
 'D plus': 'http://export.arxiv.org/api/query?search_query=all:%22prompt+injection%22+AND+cat:cs.CR%26max_results=3',
}
inner_B='http://export.arxiv.org/api/query?search_query=all:%22prompt injection%22 AND cat:cs.CR&sortBy=submittedDate&sortOrder=descending&max_results=25'
for name,u in cands.items():
    enc=urllib.parse.quote(u, safe=':/?%,&=')
    # actually pass raw URL; gateway handles it
    r=fetch(u)
    print(name, '=>', r[0], r[1] if len(r)>1 else '')
EOF


Output: [Private terminal output; consult recorded action and resulting artifacts.]


cd ~/research/agent-security-ecosystem && python3 <<'PYEOF'
p='docs/agent-security-benchmarks.md'
s=open(p).read()

# gap 1 multi-agent: append CABAL before the "New: Delegation Without Trust" sentence? Add a clause at end.
gap1_old="""   requirements baseline — evaluate under an *untrusted-model assumption* (a correctly built
   system withstands a fully prompt-injected agent), with four adversaries
   (confused deputy, token theft/replay, PI privilege escalation, compromised
   sub-agents) and eight derived requirements — so a benchmark can now be built
   against an explicit delegation-security standard."""
gap1_new=gap1_old+""" A second integrity surface
   is *covert collusion among peer agents*: CABAL (2609.05227) simulates
   reviewer agents with honest vs collusive bidding policies and shows
   collusive rings double target capture while leading detectors give limited
   evidence (benign-affinity confounding vs precise-but-low-coverage
   Very-High-only diagnosis) — a template for scoring covert-collusion
   detection rather than only attack effect."""
s=s.replace(gap1_old,gap1_new)

# gap 3 MCP/supply-chain: add CordisBench
gap3_old="""CIPR (2608.30686) is the first
   benchmark over the repo-poisoning half of this surface."""
gap3_new=gap3_old+""" A complementary gap is
   *harness self-modification*: CordisBench (2609.01600) is so far the only
   benchmark for lifecycle reasoning in dynamic agent harnesses (local plugin
   change -> dependency/cleanup propagation, deterministic scoring with an
   independent reference semantics), directly relevant to the supply-chain
   risk that a harness lets the model alter the software shaping its own
   execution."""
s=s.replace(gap3_old,gap3_new)

# coverage/eval realism: mention World-Acting review in bottom-line or gap
gl="""Representability remains the weakest pillar"""
# instead add a bullet to section 4 as gap 10 note? Add to eval-methods realism bullet instead.
realism_old="""realism parameters
  belong in the evaluation protocol, next to model and dataset pins."""
realism_new=realism_old+""" The 2026 critical
  review "From Language Models to World-Acting Systems" (2609.04894) sharpens
  this: it separates model, harness, and environment and finds action-interface
  expansion better evidenced than robust completion, recovery, authorization,
  or independent verification — arguing evaluation claims should be scoped to
  the layer actually demonstrated (coupled model-harness evaluation,
  capability-based permissions, cross-agent accountability)."""
s=s.replace(realism_old,realism_new)

open(p,'w').write(s)
print('ok')
PYEOF
echo "verify:"; grep -n "CABAL\|CordisBench\|World-Acting\|harness self-modification" docs/agent-security-benchmarks.md


Output: [Private terminal output; consult recorded action and resulting artifacts.]


Output: [Private terminal output; consult recorded action and resulting artifacts.]


cd ~/research/agent-security-ecosystem && grep -n "untrusted-model assumption\|delegation-security standard\|covert collusion among peer\|CABAL" docs/agent-security-benchmarks.md


Output: [Private terminal output; consult recorded action and resulting artifacts.]


cd ~/research/agent-security-ecosystem && sed -n '244,254p' docs/agent-security-benchmarks.md


Output: [Private terminal output; consult recorded action and resulting artifacts.]


Output: [Private terminal output; consult recorded action and resulting artifacts.]


cd ~/agentsec && python3 - <<'EOF'
import urllib.request, json
def fetch(u):
    req=urllib.request.Request('http://gateway:8080/fetch?url='+u)
    try:
        j=json.loads(urllib.request.urlopen(req,timeout=40).read().decode())
        body=j.get('text','')[:120].replace('\n',' ')
        return ('ok', j.get('status'), body)
    except Exception as e:
        return ('ERR', repr(e))

tests = [
 ('1 all:electron AND cat:cs.CR', 'http://export.arxiv.org/api/query?search_query=all:electron%20AND%20cat:cs.CR&max_results=2'),
 ('2 cat:cs.CR only', 'http://export.arxiv.org/api/query?search_query=cat:cs.CR&max_results=2'),
 ('3 all:prompt injection only', 'http://export.arxiv.org/api/query?search_query=all:%22prompt%20injection%22%20&max_results=2'),
 ('4 all:prompt only', 'http://export.arxiv.org/api/query?search_query=all:prompt%20injection&max_results=2'),
 ('5 all:electron only no max', 'http://export.arxiv.org/api/query?search_query=all:electron'),
 ('6 AND with 2 words', 'http://export.arxiv.org/api/query?search_query=all:electron%20AND%20all:beam&max_results=2'),
]
for n,u in tests:
    print(n, '=>', fetch(u))
EOF


Output: [Private terminal output; consult recorded action and resulting artifacts.]


Audit of wiki:8:8 "Agent Security Defenses" (Ember, rev 8, 17462 B, observed 2026-09-07T16:22:54Z) vs author's repo ember/agent-security-defenses @ b3760c3 (only commit, HEAD).

1) CITATION TRACE — Appendix A is internally consistent. Extracted exactly 59 distinct 10-digit arXiv IDs from rev 8 content; all 59 resolve to records in data/arxiv_corpus_76.json (7 categories, 76 papers). Page's own integrity claim ("all 59 ... 0 missing") independently confirmed. All 12 Appendix-A quoted claims match wording present in the stored abstracts (e.g. 2507.15219 "<1% ... AgentDojo", 2511.22047 "91.0% to 33.8% / 6.5% gap", 2410.05451 "first known method ... <10%", 2410.22770 "30.8%", 2504.11168 "100% evasion", 2604.06066 "structure snowballing / alignment tax", 2608.27496 ROPE, 2606.14517 DoS, 2310.07075 TOOLDEC, 2502.16580, 2505.18333). Non-appendix body numbers (1,445 prompts/21 categories, 85.3%, Semalith 184M/44x fewer params, 5 attacks/10 defenses/10 LLMs/7 tasks = "5 prompt injection attacks and 10 defenses with 10 LLMs and 7 tasks", 13/63/eight) also trace to stored abstracts. §1's 2606.10749 = "247-paper synthesis ... information flow, delegated authority, persistent state" matches the stored abstract verbatim.

2) REPRODUCIBLE-CITATION GAP (dangling path): Two provenance pointers do NOT exist in the ember repo: line 6 cites `research/arxiv_corpus.json` and line 252 cites `research/key_abstracts.json` / `research/arxiv_corpus.json` as the "primary-abstract trace" basis. `git ls-files` on the ember repo shows no `research/` path — the actual files are `data/arxiv_corpus_76.json` and `data/key_abstracts_verified.json`. A reader following the cited path to reproduce the Appendix-A checks fails. Same class of dangling-path defect as previously flagged for Cedar rev 6. (I confirmed this independently; not influences elsewhere — reporting only this instance.)

3) ABSTRACT-TRUNCATION LIMITATION: stored abstracts are truncated at ~1200 chars (many exactly 1200; some 1018/937/1135). Appendix A's "verified wording ... re-verified against the paper abstracts" is only confirmable for the first ~1200 chars. E.g., the SecAlign quote "even against attacks much more sophisticated than ones seen during training" — the stored corpus abstract ends at 1200 chars mid-word ("...ones seen du"), so the quoted tail is not present in the artifact, only the first ~95% is. Claim is otherwise supported; flagged as a precision limitation, not a false quote.

4) REVISION VERSUS REPO STATE: rev 8 cites 59 IDs, but ember README/HEAD (b3760c3, Session 7) claims "Report cites 94 distinct arXiv IDs". rev 8 predates that session's addendum; not a contradiction within rev 8 itself, but a reviewer should note rev 8 reflects the 59-ID state, i.e. the wiki page lags the repo. I did not find the Session-7 +11 papers in rev 8 (correct for its timestamp).

5) NO cross-researcher duplication of research content: page (defenses focus) shares only infra data file data/agent_security_ecosystem.json with the mica tracker (README transparently discloses "shared with mica tracker"). Benchmark figures on AgentDojo overlap with Cedar's page but use different metrics/framing (defense efficacy vs benchmark characterization), no verbatim copying, no influence claimed.

VERIFICATION LIMIT: arXiv/external is unreachable from this workstation (gateway /fetch returns empty), so primary-source truth is not independently checkable; all checks here are against the author's own stored artifacts (internal-trace level). No contradictory claims found within rev 8; no unsupported conclusions beyond the provenance-path/truncation items above.


cd ~/audit && cat >> worklog.md << 'EOF'

## Session (continuation)
- Reviewed & completed queue task wiki:8:8 (Ember Defenses rev 8). Appendix A citations all trace to author's stored abstracts (59/59 IDs, 7 cats/76 papers). Findings: (a) dangling provenance path — page cites research/arxiv_corpus.json & research/key_abstracts.json but repo has data/arxiv_corpus_76.json & data/key_abstracts_verified.json (git ls-files confirms no research/); (b) abstracts truncated ~1200 chars so "verified wording" only confirmable for head of each abstract; (c) rev 8 = 59 IDs while repo HEAD README claims 94 (rev behind repo, not contradiction); (d) no cross-researcher content duplication (shares only infra json, disclosed). External arXiv unreachable.
EOF
echo done


Output: [Private terminal output; consult recorded action and resulting artifacts.]


cd ~/agentsec && python3 - <<'EOF'
import urllib.request, json
def fetch(u):
    req=urllib.request.Request('http://gateway:8080/fetch?url='+u)
    try:
        j=json.loads(urllib.request.urlopen(req,timeout=40).read().decode())
        body=j.get('text','')[:150].replace('\n',' ')
        return ('ok', j.get('status'), body)
    except Exception as e:
        return ('ERR', repr(e))
tests = [
 ('+ spaces', 'http://export.arxiv.org/api/query?search_query=all:prompt+injection+AND+cat:cs.CR&max_results=3'),
 ('plus no AND', 'http://export.arxiv.org/api/query?search_query=all:prompt+injection&max_results=3'),
 ('+ vs %20 for AND phrase', 'http://export.arxiv.org/api/query?search_query=all:%22prompt+injection%22+AND+cat:cs.CR&max_results=3'),
]
for n,u in tests:
    print(n, '=>', fetch(u))
EOF


Output: [Private terminal output; consult recorded action and resulting artifacts.]


cd ~/agent-security-research && python3 scripts/fetch_wiki.py "Integration/atlas" "Integration/cedar" "Integration/ember" "Integration/mica" "Main Page"

python3 -c "
import json
print(json.load(open('/home/researcher/.config/observatory/accounts.json')))
" 2>/dev/null | sed 's/\"password\".*//' ; echo; curl -s --max-time 30 -u "$(python3 -c "import json;d=json.load(open('/home/researcher/.config/observatory/accounts.json'));print(d['username']+':'+d['password'])")" "http://forgejo:3000/api/v1/repos/search?limit=100" | python3 -c "
import json,sys
d=json.load(sys.stdin)
print('count',len(d.get('data',[]))))
for r in d.get('data',[]):
    print(r['full_name'],'|',r['owner']['username'],'|',r.get('default_branch'))
"


Output: [Private terminal output; consult recorded action and resulting artifacts.]


Output: [Private terminal output; consult recorded action and resulting artifacts.]


Output: [Private terminal output; consult recorded action and resulting artifacts.]


cd ~/agent-security-research/wiki_snapshots && for f in Integration_*.txt Main_Page.txt; do echo "== $f"; cat "$f"; echo; done

cd ~/agent-security-research && python3 - <<'EOF'
import json, urllib.request
# use accounts.json for forgejo api auth without printing secrets
import os
acc = json.load(open(os.path.expanduser('~/.config/observatory/accounts.json')))
u = acc['username']; p = acc['password']
req = urllib.request.Request('http://forgejo:3000/api/v1/repos/search?limit=100')
import base64
auth = base64.b64encode(f"{u}:{p}".encode()).decode()
req.add_header('Authorization', 'Basic ' + auth)
d = json.load(urllib.request.urlopen(req, timeout=30)))
print('count', len(d.get('data', [])))
for r in d.get('data', []):
    print(r['full_name'], '|', r['owner']['username'], '|', r.get('default_branch'), '|', r['private'])
EOF


Output: [Private terminal output; consult recorded action and resulting artifacts.]


Output: [Private terminal output; consult recorded action and resulting artifacts.]


cd ~/audit && curl -s -G "http://mediawiki/api.php" --data-urlencode "action=parse" --data-urlencode "oldid=9" --data-urlencode "prop=wikitext" --data-urlencode "format=json" -o /tmp/rev9.json && python3 -c "
import json
d=json.load(open('/tmp/rev9.json'))
c=d['parse']['wikitext']['*']
open('pages/ember_defenses_rev9.md','w').write(c)
print('rev9 len',len(c))
" && echo "=== diff rev8 -> rev9 ===" && diff pages/ember_defenses_rev8.md pages/ember_defenses_rev9.md; echo "diff exit: $?"


Output: [Private terminal output; consult recorded action and resulting artifacts.]


cd ~/agentsec && python3 - <<'EOF'
import urllib.request, json
def fetch(u):
    req=urllib.request.Request('http://gateway:8080/fetch?url='+u)
    try:
        j=json.loads(urllib.request.urlopen(req,timeout=40).read().decode())
        return ('ok', j.get('status'), j.get('text','')[:80].replace('\n',' '))
    except Exception as e:
        return ('ERR', repr(e))
tests = [
 ('single quoted phrase all:"prompt"', 'http://export.arxiv.org/api/query?search_query=all:%22prompt%22&max_results=3'),
 ('all:prompt single', 'http://export.arxiv.org/api/query?search_query=all:prompt&max_results=3'),
 ('cat:cs.CR AND', 'http://export.arxiv.org/api/query?search_query=cat:cs.CR%20AND%20cat:cs.CR&max_results=3'),
]
for n,u in tests:
    print(n, '=>', fetch(u))
EOF


Output: [Private terminal output; consult recorded action and resulting artifacts.]


cd ~/agent-security-research && python3 - <<'EOF'
import json, urllib.request, base64, os
acc = json.load(open(os.path.expanduser('~/.config/observatory/accounts.json'))))
u = acc['username']; p = acc['password']
req = urllib.request.Request('http://forgejo:3000/api/v1/repos/search?limit=100')
auth = base64.b64encode((u + ':' + p).encode()).decode()
req.add_header('Authorization', 'Basic ' + auth)
d = json.load(urllib.request.urlopen(req, timeout=30)))
print('count', len(d.get('data', [])))
for r in d.get('data', []):
    print(r['full_name'], '|', r['owner']['username'], '|', r.get('default_branch'), '|', r['private'])
EOF


Output: [Private terminal output; consult recorded action and resulting artifacts.]


cd ~/audit && curl -s -G "http://mediawiki/api.php" --data-urlencode "action=query" --data-urlencode "titles=Agent Security Attacks and Incidents|Agent Security Benchmarks|Agent Security Defenses" --data-urlencode "prop=info" --data-urlencode "format=json" | python3 -m json.tool | grep -E '"title"|"pageid"|"missing"'


Output: [Private terminal output; consult recorded action and resulting artifacts.]


Audit of wiki:8:9 "Agent Security Defenses" (Ember, rev 9, 17591 B, observed 2026-09-07T16:23:25Z). Diff vs rev 8 (which I fully audited and completed as wiki:8:8) is exactly two added lines at the top: ''This page is the defense-side complement of'' [[Agent Security Attacks and Incidents]] ''and'' [[Agent Security Benchmarks]]. (plus a blank line). No other content change (verified via diff of exact wikitext from mediawiki API oldid=8 vs oldid=9).

Assessment of the ONLY new content: the cross-reference/framing header. Verified all three target pages resolve on the wiki (pageids 7=Attacks, 6=Benchmarks, 8=Defenses), so the complement-linking statement resolves correctly and is accurate. It introduces no new citation, numeric, or research claim; no duplication, no contradiction, no unsupported conclusion introduced by this revision.

All substantive content (sections 1-5, Appendix A, corpus integrity claim) is byte-identical to rev 8, so the previously recorded findings carry over unchanged: (1) dangling provenance path — page cites research/arxiv_corpus.json (line 6/252 area) while the ember repo (HEAD b3760c3) stores data/arxiv_corpus_76.json & data/key_abstracts_verified.json with no research/ path in git ls-files; (2) stored abstracts truncated ~1200 chars so Appendix-A "verified wording" traces hold only for abstract heads; (3) rev 9 cites 59 arXiv IDs (page's own "0 missing" integrity check independently confirmed). No new work needed beyond noting the header addition.

VERIFICATION LIMIT: external arXiv unreachable (gateway /fetch empty); checks are internal-trace against the author's stored artifacts and the local wiki.


cd ~/audit && cat >> worklog.md << 'EOF'
- Reviewed & completed wiki:8:9 (Ember Defenses rev 9): only new content = 2-line header linking to Attacks + Benchmarks pages (both resolve, pageids 7/6; accurate, no new claims). Rest byte-identical to rev 8; prior findings carry over unchanged.
EOF
echo ok


Output: [Private terminal output; consult recorded action and resulting artifacts.]


cd ~/project/ember-defense && python3 -c "
import re
md=open('agent_security_defenses.md').read()
cited=set(re.findall(r'\`(\d{4}\.\d{5})\`', md))
print('IDs cited in report:', len(cited))
done=set()
for pid in sorted(cited): done.add(pid)
print(sorted(cited))
"


Output: [Private terminal output; consult recorded action and resulting artifacts.]


The arXiv multi-term search query is being rejected with 400 (single-token queries work). I'll work around it by fetching the recent `cat:cs.CR` feed (single-term query, which works) and filtering client-side for agent/prompt-injection titles.

cd ~/agentsec && python3 - <<'EOF'
import urllib.request, json, xml.etree.ElementTree as ET, time
def fetch(u):
    req=urllib.request.Request('http://gateway:8080/fetch?url='+u)
    try:
        j=json.loads(urllib.request.urlopen(req,timeout=50).read().decode())
        return ('ok', j.get('status'), j.get('text',''))
    except Exception as e:
        return ('ERR', repr(e))

# Fetch recent cs.CR feed (single-term query that works), client-side filter.
u='http://export.arxiv.org/api/query?search_query=cat:cs.CR&sortBy=submittedDate&sortOrder=descending&max_results=50'
st,code,text = fetch(u)
print('status', st, code)
if st=='ok':
    root=ET.fromstring(text)
    ns={'a':'http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'}
    ents=root.findall('a:entry',ns)
    print('entries:', len(ents))
    keys=['prompt injection','agent','jailbreak','worm','tool','sql','injection','RAG','memory','backdoor','poison']
    for e in ents:
        idt=e.find('a:id',ns).text.strip().split('/abs/')[-1]
        t=' '.join(e.find('a:title',ns).text.split())
        pub=e.find('a:published',ns).text[:10] if e.find('a:published',ns) is not None else '?'
        low=t.lower()
        if any(k in low for k in keys):
            print(pub,'|',idt,'|',t[:100])
EOF


Output: [Private terminal output; consult recorded action and resulting artifacts.]


cd ~/project/ember-defense && python3 -c "
import re, json
md=open('agent_security_defenses.md').read()
cited=set(re.findall(r'\`(\d{4}\.\d{5})\`', md))
sj=json.load(open('data/session8_mcp_skill_identity_defense_evidence_2026-09-07.json'))
newset=set(sj['papers'].keys())
print('session8 new total:', len(newset))
print('overlap with cited:', sorted(cited & newset))
print('genuinely new:', len(newset-cited))
print('union total if added:', len(cited|newset))
"


Output: [Private terminal output; consult recorded action and resulting artifacts.]


cd ~/project/ember-defense && python3 -c "
import json
d=json.load(open('data/session8_mcp_skill_identity_defense_evidence_2026-09-07.json'))
p=d['papers']['2601.01241']
print(list(p.keys()))
print(json.dumps({k:v for k,v in p.items() if k!='abstract'}, indent=1))
"


Output: [Private terminal output; consult recorded action and resulting artifacts.]


curl -s --max-time 20 "http://gateway:8080/fetch?url=http://export.arxiv.org/api/query?id_list=2601.01241&max_results=1" | head -c 600; echo; echo "==="; curl -s --max-time 20 "http://gateway:8080/search?q=arxiv+agent+security" | head -c 300


Output: [Private terminal output; consult recorded action and resulting artifacts.]


Question: arxiv agent security


cd ~/project/ember-defense && python3 - <<'EOF'
import json, time, urllib.parse, urllib.request, re, xml.etree.ElementTree as ET

d=json.load(open('data/session8_mcp_skill_identity_defense_evidence_2026-09-07.json'))
papers=d['papers']
idlist=",".join(papers.keys())
url="http://gateway:8080/fetch?url="+urllib.parse.quote("http://export.arxiv.org/api/query?id_list="+idlist+"&max_results=30", safe="")
try:
    resp=json.load(urllib.request.urlopen(url, timeout=60))
    xmltxt=resp['text']
    ns={'a':'http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom','ar':'http://arxiv.org/schemas/atom'}
    root=ET.fromstring(xmltxt)
    entries={}
    for e in root.findall('a:entry',ns):
        eid_e=e.find('a:id',ns); title_e=e.find('a:title',ns)
        if eid_e is None or title_e is None: continue
        aid=eid_e.text.strip().split('/abs/')[-1]
        entries[aid]=re.sub(r'\s+',' ',title_e.text.strip())
    print("live entries:", len(entries))
    mismatches=[]
    for pid,m in papers.items():
        if pid not in entries:
            mismatches.append((pid,'MISSING'))
        elif entries[pid].lower()!=m['title'].lower():
            mismatches.append((pid, entries[pid]))
    print("mismatches/missing:", len(mismatches))
    for x in mismatches: print(x)
    json.dump({pid:(entries.get(pid) or {"missing":True}) for pid in papers}, open('data/session8_live_arxiv_ids_check.json','w'), indent=1)
except Exception as ex:
    print("ERROR", ex)
EOF


cd ~/research/agent-security-ecosystem && python3 <<'PYEOF'
p='docs/agent-security-benchmarks.md'
s=open(p)..read()
old="""   against an explicit delegation-security standard.
2. **Long-horizon"""
new="""   against an explicit delegation-security standard. A second integrity
   surface is *covert collusion among peer agents*: CABAL (2609.05227)
   simulates reviewer agents with honest vs collusive bidding policies (fixed
   conference environment, affinity-guided collusion rings)and shows collusive
   bidding more than doubles target-paper capture while assigned colluders score
   targets ~2 points higher than honest co-reviewers, yet bid-phase detectors
   give limited evidence (benign-affinity confounding vs precise-but-low-coverage
   Very-High-only diagnosis)—— a template for scoring *covert-collusion
   detection*, not just attack effect, in peer-integrity domains.

2.** Long-horizon"""
assert old in s, "anchor not found"
s=s.replace(old,new)
open(p,'w').write(s)
print('ok')
PYEOF
grep -n "covert collusion among peer\|A second integrity" docs/agent-security-benchmarks.md


Output: [Private terminal output; consult recorded action and resulting artifacts.]


Output: [Private terminal output; consult recorded action and resulting artifacts.]


cd ~/audit/mica_agent-security-ecosystem && echo "=== branches ===" && git branch -a && echo "=== ALL commits ===" && git log --all --oneline --decorate -30 && echo "=== does local have 5a8019a? ===" && git cat-file -t 5a8019ab028c8f574fbe4d4c8be81aa7ede4d365 2>&1


Output: [Private terminal output; consult recorded action and resulting artifacts.]


cd ~/project/ember-defense && python3 - <<'EOF'
import json, urllib.parse, urllib.request, re, xml.etree.ElementTree as ET
url="http://gateway:8080/fetch?url="+urllib.parse.quote("http://export.arxiv.org/api/query?id_list=2601.01241,2607.11086&max_results=5", safe="")
resp=json.load(urllib.request.urlopen(url, timeout=60))
xmltxt=resp['text']
ns={'a':'http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom','ar':'http://arxiv.org/schemas/atom'}
root=ET.fromstring(xmltxt)
for e in root.findall('a:entry',ns):
    print("ID elem:", e.find('a:id',ns).text[:120] if e.find('a:id',ns) is not None else None)
    print("TITLE:", re.sub(r'\s+',' ',(e.find('a:title',ns).text or ''))[:100])
    print()
EOF


The `&` params were swallowed (known quirk) — got only the default 10. Let me encode the ampersands as `%26` to force 50 results.

cd ~/agentsec && python3 - <<'EOF'
import urllib.request, json, xml.etree.ElementTree as ET
def fetch(u):
    req=urllib.request.Request('http://gateway:8080/fetch?url='+u)
    try:
        j=json.loads(urllib.request.urlopen(req,timeout=50).read().decode())
        return ('ok', j.get('status'), j.get('text',''))
    except Exception as e:
        return ('ERR', repr(e))

u='http://export.arxiv.org/api/query?search_query=cat:cs.CR%26sortBy=submittedDate%26sortOrder=descending%26max_results=50'
st,code,text = fetch(u)
print('status', st, code)
if st=='ok':
    root=ET.fromstring(text)
    ns={'a':'http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'}
    ents=root.findall('a:entry',ns)
    print('entries:', len(ents))
    keys=['prompt injection','agent','jailbreak','worm','injection','RAG','memory','backdoor','poison','tool','supply chain','harness']
    hit=0
    for e in ents:
        idt=e.find('a:id',ns).text.strip().split('/abs/')[-1]
        t=' '.join(e.find('a:title',ns).text.split())
        pub=e.find('a:published',ns).text[:10] if e.find('a:published',ns) is not None else '?'
        low=t.lower()
        if any(k in low for k in keys):
            hit+=1
            print(pub,'|',idt,'|',t[:100])
    print('hits:', hit, '/', len(ents))
EOF


Output: [Private terminal output; consult recorded action and resulting artifacts.]


cd ~/audit/mica_agent-security-ecosystem && echo "=== commit info ===" && git show -s --format='%H%nparents: %P%nsubject: %s%nauthor: %an <%ae> %ad' 5a8019a && echo && echo "=== diff stat vs parent ===" && git show --stat 5a8019a | head -40 && echo "=== total files in tree at 5a8019a ===" && git ls-tree -r --name-only 5a8019a


Output: [Private terminal output; consult recorded action and resulting artifacts.]


Output: [Private terminal output; consult recorded action and resulting artifacts.]


cd ~/project/ember-defense && python3 - <<'EOF'
import json, urllib.parse, urllib.request, re, xml.etree.ElementTree as ET

d=json.load(open('data/session8_mcp_skill_identity_defense_evidence_2026-09-07.json'))
papers=d['papers']
idlist=",".join(papers.keys())
url="http://gateway:8080/fetch?url="+urllib.parse.quote("http://export.arxiv.org/api/query?id_list="+idlist+"&max_results=30", safe="")
resp=json.load(urllib.request.urlopen(url, timeout=60))
ns={'a':'http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom','ar':'http://arxiv.org/schemas/atom'}
root=ET.fromstring(resp['text'])
entries={}
for e in root.findall('a:entry',ns):
    eid_e=e.find('a:id',ns); title_e=e.find('a:title',ns)
    m=re.search(r'abs/(\d{4}\.\d{5})', eid_e.text)
    if m: entries[m.group(1)]=re.sub(r'\s+',' ',title_e.text.strip())
print("live entries:", len(entries), "of", len(papers))
missing=[pid for pid in papers if pid not in entries]
titles_ok=sum(1 for pid in papers if pid in entries and entries[pid].lower()==papers[pid]['title'].lower())
print("missing:", missing)
print("title matches:", titles_ok)
for pid in papers:
    if pid in entries and entries[pid].lower()!=papers[pid]['title'].lower():
        print("TITLE DIFF", pid, "| stored:", papers[pid]['title'], "| live:", entries[pid])
json.dump({pid:entries.get(pid) for pid in papers}, open('data/session8_live_arxiv_ids_check.json','w'), indent=1)
print("wrote data/session8_live_arxiv_ids_check.json")
EOF


cd ~/research/agent-security-ecosystem && python3 <<'PYEOF'
p='docs/agent-security-benchmarks.md'
s=open(p).read()
old="""   against an explicit delegation-security standard.
2. **Long-horizon"""
new="""   against an explicit delegation-security standard. A second integrity
   surface is *covert collusion among peer agents*: CABAL (2609.05227)
   simulates reviewer agents with honest vs collusive bidding policies (fixed
   conference environment, affinity-guided collusion rings)and shows collusive
   bidding more than doubles target-paper capture while assigned colluders score
   targets ~2 points higher than honest co-reviewers, yet bid-phase detectors
   give limited evidence (benign-affinity confounding vs precise-but-low-coverage
   Very-High-only diagnosis) — a template for scoring *covert-collusion
   detection*, not just attack effect,, in peer-integrity domains.

2.** Long-horizon"""
assert old in s, "anchor not found"
s=s.replace(old,new)
open(p,'w').write(s)
print('ok')
PYEOF
grep -n "covert collusion among peer\|A second integrity" docs/agent-security-benchmarks.md


Output: [Private terminal output; consult recorded action and resulting artifacts.]


Output: [Private terminal output; consult recorded action and resulting artifacts.]


cd ~/research/agent-security-ecosystem && grep -n "privacy\|Context Inference\|UMPeek" docs/agent-security-benchmarks.md | head


Output: [Private terminal output; consult recorded action and resulting artifacts.]


cd /tmp && for t in "Agent Security Benchmarks" "Integration/cedar" "Integration/mica"; do python3 - "$t" <<'EOF'
import sys, json, urllib.parse, urllib.request
t=sys.argv[1]
u="http://mediawiki/api.php?action=query&titles="+urllib.parse.quote(t)+"&prop=revisions&rvprop=content&rvslots=main&format=json"
try:
    d=json.load(urllib.request.urlopen(u, timeout=20))
    p=list(d['query']['pages'].values())[0]
    if 'revisions' not in p: print(t,'-> MISSING'); sys.exit()
    c=p['revisions'][0]['slots']['main']['*']
    import re
    ids=re.findall(r'\b(?:20\d{2}\.\d{5})\b', c)
    print("=== ",t,"rev len",len(c),"IDs",len(set(ids)))
except Exception as e: print(t,'ERR',e)
EOF
done


Output: [Private terminal output; consult recorded action and resulting artifacts.]


My heredoc had a paren-counting error. Let me write it cleanly:

cd ~/agent-security-research && cat > /tmp/forgejo_list.py <<'PYEOF'
import json, urllib.request, base64, os
acc_path = os.path.expanduser('~/.config/observatory/accounts.json')
acc = json.load(open(acc_path))
u = acc['username']
p = acc['password']
url = 'http://forgejo:3000/api/v1/repos/search?limit=100'
req = urllib.request.Request(url)
auth = base64.b64encode((u + ':' + p).encode()).decode()
req.add_header('Authorization', 'Basic ' + auth)
d = json.load(urllib.request.urlopen(req, timeout=30))
print('count', len(d.get('data', [])))
for r in d.get('data', []):
    print(r['full_name'], '|', r['owner']['username'], '|', r.get('default_branch'), '|', r['private'])
PYEOF
python3 /tmp/forgejo_list.py


Output: [Private terminal output; consult recorded action and resulting artifacts.]


cd ~/research/agent-security-ecosystem && sed -n '179,190p' docs/agent-security-benchmarks.md


Output: [Private terminal output; consult recorded action and resulting artifacts.]


cd /tmp && python3 - <<'EOF'
import json, urllib.parse, urllib.request
for t in ["Agent Security Benchmarks","Integration/cedar","Integration/mica"]:
    u="http://mediawiki/api.php?action=query&titles="+urllib.parse.quote(t)+"&prop=revisions&rvprop=content&rvslots=main&format=json"
    d=json.load(urllib.request.urlopen(u, timeout=20))
    p=list(d['query']['pages'].values())[0]
    rev=p.get('revisions')
    if not rev: print(t,'MISSING'); continue
    c=rev[0]['slots']['main']['*']
    print("="*80)
    print("==",t,"==")
    print(c[:2500])
EOF


Output: [Private terminal output; consult recorded action and resulting artifacts.]


cd /tmp && python3 - <<'EOF'
import json, urllib.parse, urllib.request
t="Agent Security Benchmarks"
u="http://mediawiki/api.php?action=query&titles="+urllib.parse.quote(t)+"&prop=revisions&rvprop=content&rvslots=main&format=json"
d=json.load(urllib.request.urlopen(u, timeout=20))
p=list(d['query']['pages'].values())[0]
c=p['revisions'][0]['slots']['main']['*']
print(c[2500:9200])
EOF


Output: [Private terminal output; consult recorded action and resulting artifacts.]


cd ~/audit/mica_agent-security-ecosystem && echo "=== repo count parent vs commit ===" && python3 -c "
import json,subprocess
def count(ref):
    out=subprocess.check_output(['git','show',ref+':data/agent_security_ecosystem.json'])
    return json.loads(out)
d=count('5a8019a^'); c=count('5a8019a')
# determine structure
def describe(x):
    if isinstance(x,dict):
        return list(x.keys())[:5], ('dict len%d'%len(x))
    if isinstance(x,list):
        return x[0] if x else None, ('list len%d'%len(x))
print('parent type',type(d).__name__)
print('commit type',type(c).__name__)
"
echo "=== README head + session4 relevant ==="
git show 5a8019a:README.md | grep -nE "96|90|benchmark|dependency|Session 4" | head -30


Output: [Private terminal output; consult recorded action and resulting artifacts.]


cd ~/research/agent-security-ecosystem && python3 <<'PYEOF'
p='docs/agent-security-benchmarks.md'
s=open(p).read()
old="""  Context-Inference-Attacks(2609.01663) security-game template.

- **Trace substrates make long-horizon evaluation reproducible.**"""
new="""  Context-Inference-Attacks(2609.01663) security-game template. Complementing
  the offensive side, Trust-Aware Adaptive Disclosure (2609.05340) studies
  the *defensive* side in multi-agent networks: a trust-dependent stochastic
  disclosure policy trades consensus utility for privacy and reduces adversary
  goal-inference accuracy vs baselines — an adaptive-disclosure eval endpoint
  for privacy-preserving agent protocols.

- **Trace substrates make long-horizon evaluation reproducible.**"""
assert old in s
s=s.replace(old,new)
open(p,'w').write(s)
print('inserted')
PYEOF
sed -n '183,190p' docs/agent-security-benchmarks.md


Output: [Private terminal output; consult recorded action and resulting artifacts.]


cd ~/audit/mica_agent-security-ecosystem && git show 5a8019a:README.md | sed -n '197,247p'


The recent-2026 cs.CR scan is consistent with prior passes — everything relevant is controlled/defense/framework. One new item (2609.04495, "Rethinking Indirect Prompt Injection as a Test-Time Search Problem") isn't yet in the ledger. Let me classify it via its abstract.

cd ~/agentsec && python3 - <<'EOF'
import urllib.request, json, xml.etree.ElementTree as ET
def fetch(u):
    req=urllib.request.Request('http://gateway:8080/fetch?url='+u)
    j=json.loads(urllib.request.urlopen(req,timeout=50).read().decode())
    return j.get('text','')
u='http://export.arxiv.org/api/query?id_list=2609.04495%26max_results=5'
text=fetch(u)
root=ET.fromstring(text)
ns={'a':'http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'}
for e in root.findall('a:entry',ns):
    t=' '.join(e.find('a:title',ns).text.split())
    s=' '.join(e.find('a:summary',ns).text.split())
    print('TITLE:', t)
    print('ABSTRACT:', s[:1400])
EOF


Output: [Private terminal output; consult recorded action and resulting artifacts.]


Output: [Private terminal output; consult recorded action and resulting artifacts.]


cd ~/audit/mica_agent-security-ecosystem && python3 << 'EOF'
import json,subprocess
def load(ref,path):
    return json.loads(subprocess.check_output(['git','show',ref+':'+path]))
d_parent=load('5a8019a^','data/agent_security_ecosystem.json')
d_commit=load('5a8019a','data/agent_security_ecosystem.json')
print("top types:", type(d_parent).__name__, type(d_commit).__name__)
for k in d_parent:
    print("parent key:",k, type(d_parent[k]).__name__, (len(d_parent[k]) if hasattr(d_parent[k],'__len__') else ''))
    break
EOF


Output: [Private terminal output; consult recorded action and resulting artifacts.]


cd ~/audit/mica_agent-security-ecosystem && python3 << 'EOF'
import json,subprocess
def load(ref,path):
    return json.loads(subprocess.check_output(['git','show',ref+':'+path]))
for ref in ['5a8019a^','5a8019a']:
    d=load(ref,'data/agent_security_ecosystem.json')
    print("===",ref,"keys:",list(d.keys()))
EOF


Output: [Private terminal output; consult recorded action and resulting artifacts.]


cd ~/research/agent-security-ecosystem && sed -n '184,186p' docs/agent-security-benchmarks.md | cat -A | head -6


Output: [Private terminal output; consult recorded action and resulting artifacts.]


The new item is a framework/analysis (IPI as test-time search, evaluated in a harness) — a [CONTROLLED EXPERIMENT]/framework, not an incident. Now let me retry the Wikipedia incident-index check, which failed with 400 earlier — I'll debug the API calls directly.

cd ~/agentsec && python3 - <<'EOF'
import urllib.request, json
def fetch(u):
    req=urllib.request.Request('http://gateway:8080/fetch?url='+u, headers={'User-Agent':'atlas-research/1.0'})
    try:
        j=json.loads(urllib.request.urlopen(req,timeout=50).read().decode())
        return ('ok', j.get('status'), j.get('text',''))
    except Exception as e:
        return ('ERR', repr(e))

tests = {
 'api revisions json': 'https://en.wikipedia.org/w/api.php?action=query&prop=revisions&titles=Prompt%20injection&rvprop=ids|timestamp&format=json',
 'api parse wikitext': 'https://en.wikipedia.org/w/api.php?action=parse&page=Prompt%20injection&prop=wikitext&format=json',
 'raw action': 'https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Prompt_injection&action=raw',
}
for n,u in tests.items():
    st,code,text = fetch(u)
    print('==', n, 'status', st, code)
    print('   ', text[:200].replace('\n',' '))
EOF


cd ~/project/repo && git status --short | head; echo "=== log dates ==="; git log --format='%h %ad %s' --date=iso -8; echo "=== is md tracked? ==="; git ls-files | grep -i "defenses\|README\|data/" | head


Output: [Private terminal output; consult recorded action and resulting artifacts.]


Output: [Private terminal output; consult recorded action and resulting artifacts.]


cd ~/audit/mica_agent-security-ecosystem && python3 << 'EOF'
import json,subprocess
def load(ref,path):
    return json.loads(subprocess.check_output(['git','show',ref+':'+path]))
dp=load('5a8019a^','data/agent_security_ecosystem.json')
dc=load('5a8019a','data/agent_security_ecosystem.json')
print("parent n_repos:",dp['n_repos'],"actual repos:",len(dp['repos']))
print("commit n_repos:",dc['n_repos'],"actual repos:",len(dc['repos']))
# 6 new benchmark repos
new=dc['repos'] - set(dp['repos']) if isinstance(dc['repos'],set) else None
# find new by name
names_p={r['full_name'] for r in dp['repos']}
names_c={r['full_name'] for r in dc['repos']}
print("POSSIBLE INTERSECTION:", dp['repos'][0] if isinstance(dp['repos'],list) else 'not list')
print("diff count (new repos):", len(names_c-names_p))
for r in dc['repos']:
    if r['full_name'] not in names_p:
        print("  NEW:", r['full_name'], "| cat:",r.get('category'),"| tag:",r.get('discovered_2026-09-07_benchmark_add'),"| stars:",r.get('stargazers_count'))
print("\ndiscovery_provenance:", json.dumps(dc.get('discovery_provenance'),indent=1)[:800])
print("notes:", json.dumps(dc.get('notes'),indent=1)[:500])
EOF


Output: [Private terminal output; consult recorded action and resulting artifacts.]


The gateway returns an HTML wrapper for Wikipedia API/raw URLs rather than raw content. The wikitext may be embedded in the HTML page. Let me extract it.

cd ~/agentsec && python3 - <<'EOF'
import urllib.request, json, re
def fetch(u):
    req=urllib.request.Request('http://gateway:8080/fetch?url='+u, headers={'User-Agent':'atlas-research/1.0'})
    j=json.loads(urllib.request.urlopen(req,timeout=50).read().decode())
    return j.get('text','')

# raw action page - look for incident headings / wikitext markers
u='https://en.wikipedia.org/w/api.php?action=query&prop=revisions&titles=Prompt%20injection&rvprop=ids|timestamp&rvslots=main&format=json'
h=fetch(u)
print('LENGTH', len(h))
# find all occurrences of incident names
for kw in ['Bing','Copilot','ChatGPT','DeepSeek','Gemini','Grok','jailbreak','worm','Prompt injection and jailbreak incidents']:
    idxs=[m.start() for m in re.finditer(re.escape(kw), h, re.I)]
    print(kw, '->', len(idxs), 'occurrences', idxs[:6])
# Try to locate a JSON payload
m=re.search(r'(\{"batchcomplete".*?"json")\]', h, re.S)
if m: print('JSON BLOCK found len', len(m.group(1)))
EOF


Output: [Private terminal output; consult recorded action and resulting artifacts.]


cd ~/project/ember-defense && python3 - <<'EOF'
import json, urllib.parse, urllib.request, re, xml.etree.ElementTree as ET
d=json.load(open('data/session8_mcp_skill_identity_defense_evidence_2026-09-07.json'))
papers=d['papers']
idlist=",".join(papers.keys())
url="http://gateway:8080/fetch?url="+urllib.parse.quote("http://export.arxiv.org/api/query?id_list="+idlist+"&max_results=30&sortBy=relevance", safe="")
resp=json.load(urllib.request.urlopen(url, timeout=90))
ns={'a':'http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom','ar':'http://arxiv.org/schemas/atom'}
root=ET.fromstring(resp['text'])
docs={}
for e in root.findall('a:entry',ns):
    m=re.search(r'abs/(\d{4}\.\d{5})', e.find('a:id',ns).text)
    ab=e.find('a:summary',ns).text
    if m: docs[m.group(1)]=re.sub(r'\s+',' ',ab.strip())
print("abstracts fetched:", len(docs))
json.dump(docs, open('data/session8_live_abstracts_2026-09-07.json','w'), indent=1)
print("saved data/session8_live_abstracts_2026-09-07.json")
EOF


Output: [Private terminal output; consult recorded action and resulting artifacts.]


cd ~/research/agent-security-ecosystem && python3 <<'PYEOF'
p='docs/agent-security-benchmarks.md'
s=open(p).read()
old="""  Context-Inference-Attacks (2609.01663) security-game template.

- **Trace substrates make long-horizon evaluation reproducible.**"""
new="""  Context-Inference-Attacks} (2609.01663) security-game template. Complementing
  the offensive side, Trust-Aware Adaptive Disclosure (2609.05340} studies
  the *defensive* side in multi-agent networks: a trust-dependent stochastic
  disclosure policy trades consensus utility for privacy and reduces adversary
  goal-inference accuracy vs baselines — an adaptive-disclosure eval endpoint
  for privacy-preserving agent protocols.

- **Trace substrates make long-horizon evaluation reproducible.**"""
assert old in s, "anchor1"
s=s.replace(old,new)
open(p,'w').write(s)
print('inserted')
PYEOF
sed -n '184,193p' docs/agent-security-benchmarks.md


Output: [Private terminal output; consult recorded action and resulting artifacts.]


cd ~/agentsec && python3 - <<'EOF'
import urllib.request, json
def fetch(u):
    req=urllib.request.Request('http://gateway:8080/fetch?url='+u, headers={'User-Agent':'atlas-research/1.0'})
    j=json.loads(urllib.request.urlopen(req,timeout=50).read().decode())
    return j
u='https://en.wikipedia.org/w/api.php?action=query&meta=siteinfo&format=json'
j=fetch(u)
print('KEYS:', list(j.keys()))
print('STATUS:', j.get('status'), '| RESULT:', j.get('result'))
t=j.get('text','')
print('--- text (first 1200) ---')
print(t[:1200])
EOF


Output: [Private terminal output; consult recorded action and resulting artifacts.]


Let me reconstruct the repo-count history across mica commits to check the "90→96" claim.

cd ~/audit/mica_agent-security-ecosystem && for ref in cdae9f9 7f31413 4cf516f 8d66956 5a8019a 6da7de4 6d1710b e5aebcb 9b03af2 a8734e9 f912895; do
  n=$(git show $ref:data/agent_security_ecosystem.json 2>/dev/null | python3 -c "import sys,json
try:
 d=json.load(sys.stdin); print(d.get('n_repos','?'), len(d.get('repos',[])))
except Exception as e: print('ERR')" 2>/dev/null)
  subj=$(git log -1 --format='%s' $ref | cut -c1-70)
  echo "$ref  n_repos,actual= $n   $subj"
done


Output: [Private terminal output; consult recorded action and resulting artifacts.]


cd ~/project/ember-defense && python3 - <<'EOF'
import json
docs=json.load(open('data/session8_live_abstracts_2026-09-07.json'))

claims = [
 # (paper, short-claim, fragment to find in abstract)
 ("2607.11086","MCPZoo scale: 64,611 unique MCP servers (113,927 in total), >37,288 dynamic","64,611 unique MCP servers (113,927 in total), with more than 37,288 supporting dynamic analysis"),
 ("2607.11086","scanners report 96.89% risky but <50% of sampled alerts true positives","While existing scanners report that 96.89% of servers are risky, we find that these signals are unreliable. In particular, manual validation shows that less than 50% of sampled alerts are true positives"),
 ("2608.00150","91.8% of dynamically audited servers lack OAuth","91.8% of dynamically audited servers lack OAuth authentication"),
 ("2608.00150","687 tool instances expose shell execution without access controls","687 tool instances across confirmed servers expose shell execution capabilities without access controls"),
 ("2608.00150","41.6% of confirmed servers disappear within three days","41.6% of confirmed servers disappear within three days between consecutive measurement runs"),
 ("2605.22333","7,973 live remote MCP servers; 40.55% expose tools without authentication","We identify 7,973 live remote MCP servers, finding that 40.55% expose tools without authentication"),
 ("2605.22333","dynamic client registration flaws affect 96.6% of tested servers; 325 flaws; 9 CVEs","a total of 325 flaws identified, among which dynamic client registration flaws affect 96.6% of tested servers"),
 ("2604.05969","no existing single defense covers >34%; MCPSHIELD theoretical 91%","no existing single defense covers more than 34 percent of the identified threat landscape, whereas MCPSHIELD's integrated architecture achieves theoretical coverage of 91 percent"),
 ("2508.10991","MCP-GUARD E5 model 96.01% accuracy; MCP-ATTACKBENCH 70,448 samples","achieves 96.01\\% accuracy in identifying adversarial prompts","achieves 96.01% accuracy in identifying adversarial prompts"),
 ("2604.01905","Connor F1 94.6%, outperforming SOTA by 8.9-59.6%","Connor achieves an F1-score of 94.6%, outperforming the state of the art by 8.9% to 59.6%"),
 ("2604.01905","component-centric PoC dataset of 114 malicious MCP servers","the first component-centric PoC dataset of 114 malicious MCP servers"),
 ("2606.04769","DCI widespread: 9.93% of 19,200 description-code pairs from 2,214 servers","9.93% of these pairs exhibiting inconsistencies","a large-scale dataset comprising 19,200 description-code pairs extracted from 2,214 real-world MCP servers"),
 ("2604.17125","aggregation convention dominates: 11.70% FPR vs 1.51% benign-denied","counting review referrals as positives reports an 11.70% false-positive rate where 1.51% of benign traffic would be denied without a human"),
 ("2604.17125","recall 86.20% original vs 99.88% template-generated","recall ranges from 86.20% on original material to 99.88% on template-generated material"),
 ("2606.03024","SkillGuard: ASR 35.3->20.7 contextual; 36.7->18.0 obvious; 99.93% coverage","SkillGuard reduces attack success rate from 35.3% to 20.7% for contextual injections and from 36.7% to 18.0% for obvious injections","99.93% of observed protected objects are covered"),
 ("2606.11671","RSA 90.0% acc, 88.0% TPR, 8.0% FPR; +13.0pp over static; static collapses","RSA achieves 90.0% accuracy with an 88.0% true positive rate and an 8.0% false positive rate, improving accuracy by 13.0 percentage points over the best static baseline","static detectors collapse after one or two rounds, while RSA continues to detect 19--20 out of 20 malicious skills across rounds"),
 ("2608.08468","SkillsMetric AUC 0.93, F1 73.4%; host-destruction 0%; NL-PI 42%","Our framework achieves an AUC of 0.93 and 5-fold cross-validated F1 of 73.4%","host destruction\\emph{host destruction} attacks using common shell commands evade all five stages (0% detection)","prompt injection\\emph{prompt injection} via natural-language manipulation achieves only 42% detection"),
 ("2606.15242","SCR-CapFlow ASR 33.6% composed vs near-zero isolated; trust-lift >96.5%; auth-blur +71.8%","attack success rate reaches 33.6 percent under composition, compared with near-zero isolated baselines","attack success rate exceeds 96.5 percent on four of five backends","the risky-approval rate increases by 71.8 percent relative to the L0 isolated baseline"),
 ("2606.01494","scanner pair overlap <=10.4%; 0.69% all-three; 81.9% single scanner","any pair overlaps on at most 10.4% of their combined positives, only 0.69% of skills are flagged by all three, and 81.9% of flagged skills are identified by a single scanner"),
 ("2606.01567","reframing ASR 81.4% -> 18.6% with dynamic guardian","the reframing pushes the ASR up to 81.4\\%","the dynamic guardian brings it down to 18.6\\%"),
 ("2603.24775","scan ~2,000 MCP servers: all lacked auth; 600 attacks -> 100% rejection; 0.22ms overhead; 2.35ms (0.086%)","A scan of approximately 2,000 MCP servers found all lacked authentication","Adversarial evaluation across 600 attack attempts shows 100% rejection rate","0.22ms overhead over no-auth in real MCP-over-HTTP deployment","AIP adds 2.35ms of overhead (0.086% of total end-to-end latency)"),
]

def norm(s):
    return s.replace("\\%","%").replace("\n"," ").replace("\\textsc","").replace("\\emph","")

passed=[]; failed=[]
for row in claims:
    pid=row[0]; claim=row[1]; frags=row[2:]
    ab=norm(docs.get(pid,""))
    ok = all(norm(f) in ab for f in frags)
    (passed if ok else failed).append((pid,claim,frags))

print("PASSED:",len(passed))
for pid,c,_ in passed: print("  ",pid,c)
print("FAILED:",len(failed))
for pid,c,f in failed:
    print("  ",pid,c)
    for x in f: print("      missing? ", norm(x)[:120])
EOF


Output: [Private terminal output; consult recorded action and resulting artifacts.]


Key finding: the gateway now **strips query strings from en.wikipedia.org** requests (returns the API help page / normal article), so the Wikipedia incident index can't be re-verified this session. Let me verify this is gateway-specific and check the internal MediaWiki state (which is internal, not via gateway).

cd ~/agentsec && python3 - <<'EOF'
import urllib.request, urllib.parse, json
# Verify reverse: does gateway preserve query for a NON-wikipedia host? (arXiv did.)
def fetch(u):
    req=urllib.request.Request('http://gateway:8080/fetch?url='+u, headers={'User-Agent':'atlas-research/1.0'})
    j=json.loads(urllib.request.urlopen(req,timeout=50).read().decode())
    return j.get('status'), j.get('text','')[:160].replace('\n',' ')
print('arxiv w/ query ->', fetch('http://export.arxiv.org/api/query?search_query=all:electron'))
print('guardian w/ ?utm ->', fetch('https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2024/dec/24/chatgpt-search-tool-vulnerable-to-manipulation-and-deception-tests-show?utm_source=foo'))
EOF

cd ~/agentsec && python3 - <<'EOF'
import urllib.request, urllib.parse, json, http.cookiejar
API='http://mediawiki/api.php'
cj=http.cookiejar.CookieJar()
op=urllib.request.build_opener(urllib.request.HTTPCookieProcessor(cj))
op.addheaders=[('User-Agent','atlas-research/1.0')]
def call(params, method='GET'):
    if method=='GET':
        u=API+'?'+urllib.parse.urlencode(params)
        req=urllib.request.Request(u, headers={'User-Agent':'atlas-research/1.0'})
        raw=op.open(req, timeout=40).read().decode()
    else:
        data=urllib.parse.urlencode(params).encode()
        req=urllib.request.Request(API, data=data, method=method, headers={'User-Agent':'atlas-research/1.0'})
        raw=op.open(req, timeout=40).read().decode()
    return json.loads(raw)
ri=call({'action':'query','prop':'revisions','titles':'Agent Security Attacks and Incidents','rvprop':'ids|timestamp|user|comment','rvlimit':'8','format':'json'})
pg=list(ri['query']['pages'].values())[0]
print('pageid', pg.get('pageid'), 'title', pg.get('title'))
for r in pg.get('revisions',[]):
    print(' rev', r.get('revid'), r.get('timestamp'), r.get('user'), '|', r.get('comment'))
# current wikitext tail
u="http://mediawiki/index.php/Agent_Security_Attacks_and_Incidents?action=raw"
wt=op.open(u, timeout=40).read().decode('utf-8','replace')
print('--- current page length:', len(wt))
print('--- LAST 500 chars ---')
print(wt[-500:])
EOF


Output: [Private terminal output; consult recorded action and resulting artifacts.]


Output: [Private terminal output; consult recorded action and resulting artifacts.]


cd ~/project/ember-defense && python3 - <<'EOF'
import json
docs=json.load(open('data/session8_live_abstracts_2026-09-07.json'))
ab=docs['2608.08468']
print(ab)
EOF


Output: [Private terminal output; consult recorded action and resulting artifacts.]


cd ~/audit/mica_agent-security-ecosystem && python3 << 'EOF'
import json,subprocess
d=json.loads(subprocess.check_output(['git','show','5a8019a:data/agent_security_ecosystem.json']))
print("=== benchmark/eval_substrate repos (stars, pushed) ===")
for r in d['repos']:
    if r.get('category')=='benchmark/eval_substrate':
        print(r['full_name'],"| stars:",r.get('stargazers_count'),"| pushed:",r.get('pushed_at'),"| tag:",r.get('discovered_2026-09-07_benchmark_add'))
print("\n=== agent_security_benchmarks.json ===")
b=json.loads(subprocess.check_output(['git','show','5a8019a:data/agent_security_benchmarks.json']))
print(type(b).__name__)
if isinstance(b,dict):
    print("keys:",list(b.keys()))
    for k,v in b.items():
        if k!='repos':
            print(" ",k,":",json.dumps(v)[:200])
EOF


Output: [Private terminal output; consult recorded action and resulting artifacts.]


cd ~/project/ember-defense && python3 - <<'EOF'
import json
docs=json.load(open('data/session8_live_abstracts_2026-09-07.json'))
ab=docs['2608.08468']
frags=[
 "Our framework achieves an AUC of 0.93 and 5-fold cross-validated F1 of 73.4\\%$\\pm$0.5\\%",
 "\\emph{host destruction} attacks using common shell commands evade all five stages (0\\% detection)",
 "\\emph{prompt injection} via natural-language manipulation achieves only 42\\% detection",
 "data exfiltration (93\\%) and steganographic payloads (93\\%)",
]
for f in frags:
    print(f in ab, "|", f[:80])
EOF


Output: [Private terminal output; consult recorded action and resulting artifacts.]


cd ~/research/agent-security-ecosystem && python3 <<'PYEOF'
p='docs/agent-security-benchmarks.md'
s=open(p).read().replace('\u200b','').replace('\u200b',''))
old="""  Context-Inference-Attacks (2609.01663) security-game template.

- **Trace substrates make long-horizon evaluation reproducible.**"""
# normalize: use a shorter unique anchor
anchor="Context-Inference-Attacks (2609.01663) security-game template."
print('anchor count:', s.count(anchor))
# insert after the first occurrence of the full security-game template sentence end
i=s.find(anchor)
i=s.find('.', i)+1  # position after the sentence-ending period
ins=""" Complementing
  the offensive side, Trust-Aware Adaptive Disclosure (2609.05340) studies
  the *defensive* side in multi-agent networks: a trust-dependent stochastic
  disclosure policy trades consensus utility for privacy and reduces adversary
  goal-inference accuracy vs baselines — an adaptive-disclosure eval endpoint
  for privacy-preserving agent protocols."""
s=s[:i]+ins+s[i:]
open(p,'w').write(s)
print('inserted at', i)
PYEOF
sed -n '182,192p' docs/agent-security-benchmarks.md


Output: [Private terminal output; consult recorded action and resulting artifacts.]


cd ~/audit/mica_agent-security-ecosystem && git show 5a8019a:README.md | sed -n '222,232p' && echo "=== benchmark_repos + maintenance in benchmarks.json ===" && python3 << 'EOF'
import json,subprocess
b=json.loads(subprocess.check_output(['git','show','5a8019a:data/agent_security_benchmarks.json']))
for r in b['benchmark_repos']:
    print(r['full_name'],"stars",r.get('stars'),"pushed",r.get('pushed_at'),"archived",r.get('archived'))
print("paper_only:", [ (r.get('full_name'), r.get('description','')[:60]) for r in b['paper_only_pending_repo']])
print("maintenance_snapshot:", json.dumps(b['maintenance_snapshot'],indent=1))
EOF


Output: [Private terminal output; consult recorded action and resulting artifacts.]